

SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND LOTTERY STOCK MANIA

AVTORJI: Turan G. Bali, David Hirshleifer, Lin Peng, Yi Tang, Qiguang Wang

POVZETEK: Raziskava je proučila, kako socialne interakcije vplivajo na vložnično čustvo in cene akcij, ki so podobne loteriji. Izrazi socialne omiljene aktivnosti o akciji na platformah, kot so StockTwits in Facebook, so povezane z večjim številom ekstremnih cinkov in večjo vrednostjo, ki jo vloženci pripišeta te akciji. Akcije, ki so v vejah z večjo socialno povezanostjo, imajo nizko spodnjo vrednost in večja razbiralnost med vloženci. Te ugotovitve podpirajo teorije, ki pravijo, da socialne interakcije vplivajo na vložnično čustvo in cene akcij.

METODA: Raziskovalci je uporabili podatke iz dveh družbenih omiljenih platform: StockTwits in Facebook. Podatki o socialni aktivnosti o akciji na StockTwits so povezani z ekstremnimi cinkovimi dogodki, kot so večja cinkovita povezanost in večja vrednost, ki jo vloženci pripišeta akciji. Podatki iz Facebooka so podrobno preverili, kako socialna povezanost v regijah, v katerih so akcije izdane, vpliva na cene akcij.

KLJUČNE UGOTOVITVE:

- Večja socialna aktivnost o akciji na StockTwits povezana je z večjim številom ekstremnih cinkov in večjo vrednostjo, ki jo vloženci pripišeta te akciji.
- Akcije, ki so v regijah z večjo socialno povezanostjo, imajo nizko spodnjo vrednost in večja razbiralnost med vloženci.
- Te ugotovitve podpirajo teorije, ki pravijo, da socialne interakcije vplivajo na vložnično čustvo in cene akcij.

POMEN ZA TRGOVANJE: Raziskava podpira teorije, da socialne interakcije lahko vplivajo na vložnično čustvo in cene akcij, ki so podobne loteriji. To je posebno relevantno za vložnike, ki uporabljajo družbeni omiljeni platforme za informacije o akcijah. Trgovci bi morali biti v poročilu o socialnih interakcijah in njihovem vplivu na cene akcij, da lahko bolje razumejo trendi in prilagajajo svoje strategije.

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ABSTRACT

We find that social interactions are associated with stocks becoming more lottery-like and with greater investor overoptimism about the lottery characteristic. Heightened social media activity about a stock predicts extreme daily price run-ups—lottery events. Lottery event stocks subject to more extensive social media discussions subsequently experience greater retail buying pressure—particularly from Robinhood users—followed by lower returns. Moreover, lottery stocks of firms headquartered in more socially connected counties experience lower subsequent returns. Using staggered adoption of state-level social media privacy laws for identification, our findings support theories where social interactions incite investor excitement and asset price bubbles.

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1. Introduction

There is extensive evidence that investors—especially retail investors—are attracted to stocks with lottery-like payoffs, resulting in high valuations of such assets and low subsequent returns.¹ Recent years have seen the rise of a modern incarnation of lottery investing in the form of meme stocks such as GameStop, AMC, and Palantir. Speculation in lottery-like assets, including options, meme tokens, and cryptocurrencies, intensified during 2024 and early 2025.² Meme stocks are also associated with the gamification and democratization of finance, as exemplified by Robinhood, a zero commission retail trading platform.

In remarks that seem to reflect these trends, Warren Buffet’s annual shareholder letter released on February 24, 2024 drew parallels between today’s stock market and a casino (Buffett 2024): “For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young.” Buffet further noted, “The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.”

The rise of meme stocks has gone hand in hand with activity on popular investor social media platforms such as StockTwits and Reddit. Stories about retail investors becoming millionaires overnight from investing in meme stocks and other speculative assets have sparked extensive discussions on social media platforms. While previous studies on lottery stocks have primarily focused on the role of fixed preferences that favor lottery characteristics at the individual investor level (Barberis and Huang 2008; Brunnermeier and Parker 2005), these recent developments raise the questions of how social interactions direct investor attention and enthusiasm toward speculative investments (Hirshleifer 2020, Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden 2022; Pedersen 2022).

¹See, e.g., Kumar (2009), Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010), Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011), Green and Hwang (2012), Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016), and Liu et al. (2020). The maximum daily return over a month (MAX), a proxy for stock lottery, is among the most influential return predictors in machine learning models (Gu, Kelly, and Xiu 2020) and largely subsumes the betting-against-beta effect (Bali et al. 2017). Moreover, Chen et al. (2025) find that lottery-related narratives are prevalent among stocks that are in the short legs of the 186 anomalies of Chen and Zimmermann (2022). Furthermore, the predictive power of the MAX effect has remained robust over time (see Section 2.1).

²For example, this period saw extreme price increases in GameStop and BlackBerry, while newly launched meme coins, including two associated with Donald and Melania Trump, reached multi-billion dollar market capitalizations within weeks of their debuts (Hur 2025).

To address these issues, we use data from two types of social networks: a leading investment social media platform, StockTwits, and a general-interest social media platform that is representative of the general population, Facebook. Using data from the investment social media platform, we find that the amount of social media discussion about a stock predicts both the likelihood of an extreme daily price run-up (a lottery event) and its magnitude. Among stocks that exhibit prominent lottery features (high “lotteriness”), higher social media activity predicts more aggressive retail buying and greater overvaluation, as evidenced by substantially lower subsequent returns and more negative price reactions to future earnings announcements. These stocks also experience greater investor disagreement and higher trading volume.

Furthermore, the finding for the general interest social media platform reinforces the insights derived from the investment social media platform. On Facebook as well, lottery stocks of firms headquartered in counties with stronger social connectivity experience greater overpricing. Together, these results based on both types of social media platforms suggest that social mechanisms play a crucial role in the emergence, pricing dynamics, and trading patterns of lottery stocks.

Our tests are motivated by theoretical models in which social interactions propagate incorrect beliefs and cause naïve allocation of investor attention.³ [Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo \(2016\)](#) provide an epidemiological model in which home buyer beliefs with differing optimism spread via social interactions, resulting in housing booms and busts. In the model of [Hirshleifer \(2020\)](#), stock market bubbles are caused by the social transmission of folk mental models about market fundamentals. As applied to mental models about the prospects of firms for big successes, this implies price bubbles in lottery stocks. In

³In several theoretical models, social interactions amplify the effects of behavioral biases or induce transmission bias ([DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel 2003](#), [Hirshleifer 2020](#), [Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden 2022](#)), trigger information cascades or imperfectly rational herding ([Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992](#), [Banerjee 1992](#), [Eyster and Rabin 2014](#)), and cause informational free-riding ([Han and Yang 2013](#)). Keeping-Up-with-the-Joneses or status-related preferences can also induce herding into risky securities and heavy trading of local stocks ([DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer 2008](#), [Roussanov 2010](#), [Hong et al. 2014](#)). Additionally, research on group decision-making documents inefficient information aggregation in experiments and the field (e.g., [Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsäcker 2018](#), [Duffy et al. 2019](#); [Enke and Zimmermann 2019](#)). See also the review of social learning theory of [Bikhchandani et al. \(2024\)](#) and the review of empirical research on social asset pricing of [Hwang \(2023\)](#).

[Pedersen \(2022\)](#), as investment ideas propagate through social interactions, influential “fanatics” substantially affect the equilibrium price owing to their influence on listeners. The social interactions between rational agents and fanatics over time cause attraction to speculative stocks, price bubbles, and subsequent reversals.

The bubble dynamics in these models indicates that greater social interaction can promote extreme temporary price run-ups. Such effects are reminiscent of the meme stock bubbles of 2021. If we measure lotteriness by the occurrence of an extreme price run-up, then such models imply that social interactions can cause a stock to become a lottery stock.

Similarly, in the social transmission model of [Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden \(2022\)](#), social interactions lead to positive investor feedback in response to high past returns, thereby intensifying upside price movements. Furthermore, in this model, stocks with high skewness are overpriced and on average earn low subsequent abnormal returns. This occurs because high returns are disproportionately reported by signal senders and highly salient to signal receivers, leading the latter to become overoptimistic about the stocks they hear about.

Alternative approaches to the mispricing of lottery stocks are based on nonstandard preferences for lottery-like payoffs ([Brunnermeier and Parker 2005](#); [Barberis and Huang 2008](#)) or on decision weights distorted toward salient payoffs ([Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012, 2013](#)). In these theories investors know the relevant payoff distributions (i.e., the lottery features) of stocks. In practice, lotteriness varies over time, and investors with limited attention do not continually monitor all stocks for changes. We propose that investors often learn about a stock’s potential for extreme gains through their social networks. Social interactions can therefore amplify preference- or salience-based mispricing effects by directing investor attention to lottery-like features.

Based on these considerations, we hypothesize that social interactions contribute to the pricing and trading of lottery stocks in two ways. First, for a stock with high lotteriness, social interactions stimulate optimism about the stock’s future payoffs, and direct investor

attention to the stock, both of which imply retail buying and overpricing. Second, social interactions can contribute to a stock becoming more lottery-like. Once this occurs, the first channel promotes buying. Based on both considerations, we predict that investor attraction to and market overpricing of lottery stocks increase with the extent of social interactions among potential investors.

To test this hypothesis, we construct two key measures: a measure of the lotteryiness of a stock and a measure of the extent of social interaction. Our primary measure of a stock's lotteryiness follows the approach of [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#). We identify days on which a stock attains its highest return within a trailing 21-trading-day window and denote these as MAX events, with the corresponding returns labeled MAXRET. The magnitude of MAXRET captures the lotteryiness; lottery events are defined as MAX events for which MAXRET is in the top decile cross-sectionally. We also confirm robustness using the alternative lottery index of [Kumar \(2009\)](#).

We measure the extent of social interactions and word-of-mouth discussions by analyzing activity on StockTwits, the largest finance-oriented social media platform in which investors share their opinions. Our dataset comprises over 123 million messages posted by 858,168 users between 2010 and 2022, covering 6,528 distinct stocks. We measure social media engagement by the daily volume of StockTwits messages referencing a specific stock.

We use these measures to investigate the hypothesis that social interactions promote high valuations of lottery stocks. We first document a sharp increase in message activity referencing a stock around lottery events. This suggests the possibilities that these discussions triggered such events, that such events are highly salient and heavily discussed by investors in their online social interactions, or both.

To assess whether lottery stocks are overpriced, we test whether lotteryiness negatively predicts returns, and whether social interactions influence the sensitivity of subsequent returns to a stock's lotteryiness. Previous studies have found that extreme positive one-day returns on a stock negatively predict future returns in the following month. To test for the

effects of social interactions, we compare one-month-ahead returns for stocks with MAX events, focusing on those with elevated StockTwits message volume in the days leading up to the event versus those without such activity.

We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in MAXRET combined with elevated message volume, is associated with much lower one-month-ahead returns—a difference of 136 basis points (relative to low-message MAX events). Notably, message volume, when interacted with MAXRET, fully absorbs the predictive power of MAXRET itself in forecasting future returns. This relation remains robust after controlling for information supply or widely used proxies derived from Google and Bloomberg searches for retail and institutional attention (Da, Engelberg, and Gao 2011; Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen 2017). These results indicate that the association between StockTwits message volume and the high valuation of lottery stocks is not explained by information environment and existing attention measures.

Another standard approach to testing for and estimating overpricing is to test for price corrections at subsequent earnings announcement dates. If lottery stocks are overpriced, the release of fundamental news should trigger corrections that are commensurate with the initial level of overpricing. We find that lottery stocks on average experience negative abnormal returns in the days around the next quarter's earnings announcement dates, with more negative returns for stocks that had higher message volume prior to the MAX day. These findings provide further support for the hypothesis that more extensive social interactions promote more overoptimistic expectations about lottery stocks.

We then probe underlying mechanisms by exploring how social media discussions influence the likelihood that a stock experiences a lottery event and whether these discussions affect the subsequent trading behavior of investors. We first provide evidence that social media discussion directly predicts the extent to which a stock becomes more lottery-like. Stocks that become the focus of extensive discussions on StockTwits are 65% more likely to experience a lottery event the following day relative to the mean. Additionally, among

stocks that experience a lottery event, those with extensive pre-event discussions have an average event-day return that is 17% higher than the unconditional mean.

Social interactions are endogenous, so the relationship between StockTwits message activity and lottery events could be driven by omitted factors. To address this possibility, we exploit the staggered adoption of state-level social media privacy laws, which added protections to employees from employer surveillance. These changes likely made individuals more willing to participate in online discussions.

We find that when a state adopts such a law, the number of StockTwits messages concerning firms headquartered in the state increases substantially. Using this policy change as an instrument for StockTwits message volume, we find that the instrumented message volume strongly predicts the occurrence of lottery events. Overall, the evidence is consistent with StockTwits activity promoting the occurrence of lottery events.

Retail investors, in particular, are more likely to be drawn to the salient features of lottery stocks and are more susceptible to the influence of social media. We therefore expect that social interactions will especially bolster demand for lottery stocks among retail investors. We test this hypothesis using two types of data: trading activity on the Robinhood platform and aggregate retail order flows.

The Robinhood platform has been the go-to platform for retail investors central to the meme stock phenomenon. Using stock popularity data from the Robintrack website, we investigate whether StockTwits message volume around a lottery event predicts Robinhood buy-herding episodes, defined as a day with a sharp increase in the number of Robinhood users holding a stock. Following a lottery event, stocks with more extensive discussion on StockTwits are 38% more likely to experience a Robinhood buy herding episode in the next week than the average lottery stock.

To assess whether our findings on StockTwits messages and buy herding on Robinhood are representative of retail traders more broadly, we examine aggregate retail order imbalances using measures proposed by [Boehmer et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Barber et al. \(2024\)](#). We find that, conditional on a lottery event, heavier discussion on StockTwits is associated

with greater aggregate retail net purchases in the following week. This evidence suggests that our findings generalize to the broader population of retail investors, where greater social media discussion is linked to more aggressive retail buying of lottery stocks.

Together, the evidence that StockTwits message volume predicts the emergence of lottery stocks, amplifies their subsequent underperformance, and predicts retail buying—particularly by more speculative investors on Robinhood—is consistent with the social interaction models of [Hirshleifer \(2020\)](#), [Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden \(2022\)](#), and [Pedersen \(2022\)](#). Theories of social interactions further suggest that such interactions can spread rumors, propagate incorrect beliefs, and introduce signal mutation, thereby creating scope for investor disagreement and trading.⁴ Motivated by these insights, we test whether greater StockTwits message activity around lottery events is associated with greater investor disagreement and trading volume. These dimensions of investor beliefs and trading have not been systematically examined in previous empirical studies of lottery stocks.

We find that lottery stocks with elevated message volume on the days leading up to the lottery event experience more message sentiment disagreement over the following two weeks—by 6.4% and 7.9% of the sample mean—relative to those without such message volume. These stocks also see substantially higher share turnover during the same period, by 42.3% and 46.2%, relative to the sample mean, respectively. These findings provide further evidence that social interactions influence belief updating following lottery events.

Although StockTwits is the largest finance-specific social media platform, it only constitutes a subset of investors, raising the question of how representative StockTwits is of the thinking and behavior of investors at large. Our finding that StockTwits activity predicts real trading outcomes suggests that the information extracted from the platform is not a mere sideshow. To further address generalizability, we use large-scale Facebook-based social network data to construct an alternative proxy for the extent of social interaction among investors.

⁴See, for example, [Shiller \(2000\)](#), [Hirshleifer \(2020\)](#), and [Pedersen \(2022\)](#)). Evidence consistent with this possibility is provided by [Hirshleifer, Peng, and Wang \(2024\)](#), who also present a theoretical model of these issues.

The Facebook Social Connectedness Index (SCI; [Bailey et al. 2018b](#)) measures friendship probability between Facebook users across counties. Compared to the investing-focused StockTwits-based measure, SCI better captures long-run, real-world social ties between counties and therefore provides a complementary measure in testing our hypothesis.⁵ Our tests are motivated by extensive evidence that investors are more attentive to nearby firms and are more likely to invest in and trade the stocks of such firms (see, e.g., [Coval and Moskowitz 1999](#), [Huberman 2001](#)). As investors discuss their gains from investing in local stocks, particularly those with lottery-like characteristics, news about these stocks spreads from local investors to those in other counties through word of mouth. Consequently, such stocks tend to be extensively discussed among a broader range of investors. We therefore expect that lottery stocks based in counties with higher social connectivity will attract greater investor interest, leading to increased overvaluation.

To test this, we define a firm's headquarters social connectedness (SCIH) as the sum of connectedness of the firm's headquarters to all other U.S. counties. Higher SCIH implies that a lottery stock is more likely to be discussed by investors across the U.S., triggering stronger demand for the stock. Consistent with this, we find that lottery stocks headquartered in high-SCIH counties experience more negative returns over the next three months, suggesting that greater social connectivity amplifies the overvaluation of these stocks. The consistency of our findings across both large-scale Facebook-based network data and the more granular StockTwits-based investor network reinforces this conclusion.

Meme stock episodes suggest that retail investors are especially attracted to lottery characteristics, perhaps both directly and because of high susceptibility to social influence. The growing importance of retail trading for the stock market implies that the social transmission of demand for lottery stocks can be important for both large and small stocks.⁶ Even large-cap stocks, such as Amazon, Facebook, Google, Nvidia, and Tesla,

⁵As the world's largest online social network, Facebook's enormous scale and coverage (over 258 million monthly active users in the US as of 2020) and the relative representativeness of its user base make its social network a unique measure of the real-world geographic structure of US social networks at the population scale ([Bailey et al. 2018a,b, 2020, 2025](#); [Chetty et al. 2022](#)).

⁶Retail trading has become increasingly important in financial markets overall, representing a rapidly growing share of market trading activity. By 2021, retail trading in the U.S. accounted for almost as much volume as mutual funds and hedge funds combined ([Martin and Wigglesworth 2021](#)). At the start of

have also qualified as lottery stocks at various points in our sample, drawing substantial retail investor attention.⁷ Additionally, there is evidence that actively managed funds may also be attracted to lottery stocks (Agarwal, Jiang, and Wen 2022). These findings underscore the importance of understanding the drivers behind the rise of lottery stocks and investors' demand for such stocks.

Our paper contributes to the literature on the overpricing of lottery characteristics and associated negative return predictability by providing evidence consistent with the newer, social-based theories about the formation of lottery stock bubbles and investor behavior during such episodes. These findings also add new insights into the growing literature on social media in finance,⁸ and the more general literature on retail investors as a possible source of stock market anomalies,⁹ including research on Robinhood investors.¹⁰ Furthermore, Green and Jame (2024) find that such retail trading frenzies are predictive of equity issuance and increased real investment. Our evidence suggests that retail attention is socially transmitted, and that social networks promote speculative stock trading.

2. Data, Variable Definitions, and Preliminary Tests

Our sample consists of US common stocks ($SHRCD = 10$ or 11) traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for the period from June 1963 through December 2022. We obtain investor social media data from StockTwits for 2010–2022, stock data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and other accounting and financial statement variables from the merged CRSP-Compustat database.

2023, daily U.S. retail investor inflows reached a record-breaking high of \$1.5 billion—more than double the pre-2019 figure of just over \$600 million (Rao 2023).

⁷Appendix Table A1 details such large-cap lottery events. For the 2010–2022 sample period, there are 148 stock-months of these large-cap lottery stock observations, with mean and median daily abnormal Google search volume (ASV) over the $[-11, 0]$ pre-lottery event window of 20% and 17%, respectively. In addition, 122 stock-month observations exhibit abnormal StockTwits activity, with their pre-event message counts ranking in the top 10% cross-sectionally.

⁸See Antweiler and Frank (2004), Chen et al. (2014), Giannini, Irvine, and Shu (2019), Cookson and Niessner (2020), Chen and Hwang (2022), Farrell et al. (2022), and Cookson, Engelberg, and Mullins (2023).

⁹See Barber and Odean (2008), Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), Kelley and Tetlock (2013, 2017), Yuan (2015), Atilgan et al. (2020), and Boehmer et al. (2021).

¹⁰See Welch (2022), Barber et al. (2022), Ozik, Sadka, and Shen (2021) and Eaton et al. (2022).

2.1. The Lottery Characteristic and Returns to Lottery-Based Portfolios

Our measure of the lotteryiness of a stock follows the approach of [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#) (BCW), who use a stock's maximum daily return in a given month to measure its lottery-like characteristics for that month and predict the following month returns. Notably, meme stocks repeatedly appear in the top decile of our monthly lotteryiness measure (see Figure 1), which suggests that the maximum daily return-based measure of lotteryiness captures the meme stock phenomenon. However, the original BCW definition is unsuitable for tests of predictability at a daily frequency as it would introduce look-ahead bias. For example, it would be inappropriate on January 15 to use the highest return during all of January to predict returns for January 16 as the highest return contains information subsequent to January 16.¹¹

We therefore modify the BCW measure to provide a measure suitable for a daily event-study design. This modification avoids look-ahead bias by defining lotteryiness based on a trailing-window of returns. This makes a high-frequency analysis feasible. As mentioned in the introduction, we define our lotteryiness measures in two steps. First, a stock is considered to experience a MAX event on a given day if its return is the highest in that day's trailing 21-trading-day window; this peak return is termed as MAXRET. Second, a stock experiences a lottery event if it has a MAX event and its corresponding MAXRET value also falls in the top 10% when compared to the highest single-day returns of all stocks in their respective trailing 21-trading-day windows. This approach generates a candidate return predictor that is constructed solely from past data.

To assess whether this modified maximum daily return measure, MAXRET, exhibits predictive power comparable to that of the original BCW measure, we repeat the tests in [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#) for the period spanning June 1963 to December 2022,

¹¹An alternative way to define lotteryiness uses three characteristics: low price, high idiosyncratic volatility, and high idiosyncratic skewness ([Kumar 2009](#)). Since these characteristics have limited daily variation, the maximum daily return-based lotteryiness measure is better suited for our purposes. Other studies of lottery-like securities include [Kumar, Page, and Spalt \(2011, 2016\)](#), [Han and Kumar \(2013\)](#), [Boyer and Vorkink \(2014\)](#), and [An et al. \(2020\)](#).

replacing the original BCW measure with MAXRET. When a stock experiences multiple MAX events in a month, we use the highest MAXRET value. Specifically, for each month, we sort stocks into decile portfolios based on their monthly MAXRET values and compute the value-weighted portfolio returns for the subsequent month. Appendix Table A2, Panel A, indicates that the resulting long-short portfolios yield negative and highly significant return spreads of 82 to 120 basis points per month. These spreads are driven primarily by the underperformance of high-MAXRET stocks. For comparison, untabulated results indicate that the long-short portfolio based on the original BCW measure generates a similar spread of 73 and 117 basis points, also driven by the underperformance of stocks with high BCW values. Panels B and C replicate the [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#) Fama-MacBeth regressions using the MAXRET and the original BCW measures, respectively, and confirm these results.¹² As the MAXRET measure exhibits return predictability comparable to that of the original BCW measure, we adopt MAXRET as our primary variable of interest for studying the relationships between lotteryiness and social media activity, trading behavior, and stock returns.

Furthermore, we find that the MAX-based lottery effect is not confined to small-cap stocks and remains potent in the recent sample (see Appendix Table A3, which reproduces Appendix Table A2 for a sample that excludes microcaps ([Fama and French 2008](#)), defined as stocks with market cap below the 20th NYSE percentile as described in Panel A, and for firms with above-NYSE-median market capitalization as described in Panel B). In both subsamples, the negative return predictive power of MAXRET remains robust, confirming that the lottery demand effect is economically meaningful even among the larger stocks that drive value-weighted portfolios. These effects show little post-publication decay. This contrasts with many return predictors in the literature; [McLean and Pontiff \(2016\)](#) report that the predictive power of typical anomalies declines by an average of 58% after publication. In contrast, Appendix Table A4 provides evidence that the performance

¹²The lower observation count in Appendix Table A2, Panel B (relative to Panel C), reflects construction differences: Panel C relies on a monthly MAX (BCW), so all stock-months enter; Panel B relies on a 21-day MAX, so stock-months without any MAX event are excluded. We also perform robustness checks using the lottery index adapted from [Kumar \(2009\)](#), which has a correlation of approximately 0.6 with MAXRET; results are reported in Subsection 6.3. Our findings are also robust to alternative definitions of lottery events, as detailed in Subsection 6.4.

of MAX and MAXRET remained economically large and highly statistically significant during the post-publication period of [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#) (March 2011–December 2022).

2.2. StockTwits Data

Our primary measure for the extent of social interaction uses data from StockTwits, a leading social media platform where investors share their investment experiences and opinions. Similar to Twitter, StockTwits allows users to post short messages, initially limited to 140 characters until May 8, 2019, when the limit was expanded to 1,000 characters. What sets StockTwits apart from Twitter is its exclusive focus on financial markets. The platform was the first to introduce the cashtag notation, using the ticker symbol of a stock in a message (e.g., \$TSLA for Tesla).

Using the StockTwits API, we compile a dataset of over 123 million messages posted by 858,168 users between 2010 and 2022 covering 6,528 distinct common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.¹³ We define *Message* as the number of messages mentioning a stock during a given time period, measuring the extent of investor social interactions regarding that stock. Higher message counts indicate greater social engagement among investors.

2.3. Other Variables

We obtain the daily and monthly return and volume data from CRSP. We adjust stock returns for delisting to avoid survivorship bias ([Shumway 1997](#)). Unless otherwise stated, all variables are measured as of the end of the previous month of a MAX event so that there is no look-ahead bias in our empirical tests.

We use a number of well-known cross-sectional return predictors as control variables. Specifically, following [Fama and French \(1992\)](#), we estimate a stock's market beta (BETA) using monthly returns over the preceding five years, and compute the stock's size (SIZE)

¹³The API is available at <https://api.StockTwits.com/developers>. This dataset has been increasingly used in recent studies; see, e.g., [Cookson and Niessner \(2020\)](#) and [Cookson, Engelberg, and Mullins \(2023\)](#).

as the product of the price per share and the number of shares outstanding (in millions of dollars). The book-to-market equity ratio (BM) at the end of June of year t is computed as the book value of stockholders' equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of the preferred stock for the last fiscal year ending in $t - 1$, scaled by the market value of equity at the end of December of $t - 1$. Following [Fama and French \(2015\)](#) and [Hou, Xue, and Zhang \(2015\)](#), a stock's investment related characteristic is measured by the annual growth rate of total assets (IA) at the end of June of year t is measured by the change in book assets (Compustat item AT) for the last fiscal year ending in year $t - 1$ divided by lagged AT. Similarly, quarterly operating profitability (OP) is determined by income before extraordinary items (item IBQ) for the most recent fiscal quarter, with quarterly earnings announcements made in or prior to, but no longer than six months before the portfolio formation month, divided by one-quarter-lagged book equity. Momentum (MOM) is the cumulative return of a stock over a period of 11 months ending one month prior to the portfolio formation month ([Jegadeesh and Titman 1993](#)). Following [Jegadeesh \(1990\)](#), we include past one-month return (REV) to capture the short-term reversal effect. We define a stock's monthly co-skewness (COSKEW) following [Harvey and Siddique \(2000\)](#). Following [Amihud \(2002\)](#), a stock's monthly illiquidity (ILLIQ, scaled by 10^6) is the average daily ratio of the absolute stock return to the dollar trading volume.¹⁴

¹⁴We require a minimum of 24 monthly observations for market beta and co-skewness, computed from monthly data over the past five years, and a minimum of 15 daily observations for Amihud illiquidity, computed from daily data in a month. Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of the preferred stock. Following [Bali, Brown, and Tang \(2017\)](#), our data for the operating profitability variable (OP) begins in 1972. This reflects the limited availability of earnings announcement dates (Compustat item "RDQ") before 1972, a critical variable necessary for properly lagging OP relative to future stock returns and avoiding potential look-ahead bias. Following [Gao and Ritter \(2010\)](#), we adjust for institutional features of the way that the NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX volumes are counted. Specifically, we divide the NASDAQ volume by 2.0, 1.8, 1.6, and 1 for the following periods respectively: pre- February 2001, between February 2001 and December 2001, between January 2002 and December 2003, and January 2004 or later. To mitigate the effects of outliers in the regression tests, we winsorize all explanatory variables cross-sectionally at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distribution (i.e., the thresholds are calculated for each regression sample), with the exception of discrete variables (e.g., the high-message indicator) and log-transformed variables (such as the natural logarithm of firm size and the book-to-market ratio).

2.4. Preliminary Tests and Summary Statistics

We first provide preliminary evidence that StockTwits message activity is strongly associated with the lotteryiness of a stock. Our tests are performed at the individual stock-day level, centered around each stock's MAX event days. (In this paper, "day" or "days" refer to trading days, unless explicitly stated otherwise.) Each day, we sort stocks that experienced MAX events into decile portfolios based on their MAXRET, with Decile 10 corresponding to the events with the top 10% MAXRET in the cross-section (i.e., lottery stocks).

Figure 2 displays the average daily number of StockTwits messages for each decile portfolio around the MAX events (day 0). Notably, there is a sharp increase in message counts on day 0 for lottery stocks (in Decile 10), rising from below 50 messages prior to the event day to nearly 150 messages on the MAX day. These elevated message activity persists for up to five days following the event. This suggests that the lottery events are highly salient and heavily discussed online. The message activity for the lottery stocks rises even before the MAX event, particularly on the day immediately preceding the event. In comparison, stocks in Decile 9 experience only a slight increase in message activity and there are no significant changes in message activity around the MAX events for stocks in the other deciles.

We next present summary statistics for the key variables of interest and the controls for the MAX event sample. Panel A of Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the aforementioned variables. The mean (median) MAXRET is 6.42 (4.41) percentage points, and there is substantial variation, with a standard deviation of 9.32 percentage points. The MAXRET 90th percentile is 11.96 percentage points.

Our measure of StockTwits communication activity is the variable Messages, which corresponds to the number of messages posted from day -11 up to, and including, the MAX event day (which we call day 0). The distribution of the variable is highly right-skewed, with a median value of 12, mean of 108.17, and an average skewness of 214.0. There tend to be very low message counts for most of the MAX event observations,

whereas for popular stocks in the top 10th percentile, the average message counts exceeds 123. Given this, we define an indicator variable, $\mathbb{1}_{msg}$, which takes the value of one if message counts for the $[-11, 0]$ window rank above the 90th percentile of its cross-sectional distribution, and zero otherwise. Stocks with $\mathbb{1}_{msg} = 1$ are those with the most extensive social media discussion.¹⁵

Panel B of Table 1 presents the correlations among the variables used in this study. For example, $\mathbb{1}_{msg}$ is associated with lower one-month-ahead returns, with a correlation of -1.9% . Furthermore, $\mathbb{1}_{msg}$ is positively correlated with stock characteristics such as MAXRET, market beta, size, investment growth, momentum, and coskewness, and negatively correlated with book-to-market.

In our subsequent tests, we investigate how measures of social interactions are associated with the returns and trading of lottery stocks. We control for stock characteristics are known from earlier studies to predict future returns and trading activity.

3. Social Interactions and Returns to Lottery-like Stocks

As discussed in the introduction, social transmission bias can cause investors to be attracted to lottery stocks (Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden 2022) and communication can generate the “GameStop”-like price bubbles (Pedersen 2022). Furthermore, social interactions can amplify the visibility of a stock’s lottery-like characteristic, thereby magnifying the effect on investor demand of inherent preferences that favor lottery features or of investor attention to salient payoffs (Barberis and Huang 2008; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012, 2013; Brunnermeier and Parker 2005). In this section, we test the pricing implications of the proposed mechanisms and examine whether social interactions amplify the overvaluation of lottery stocks by examining post-event returns and price reactions to subsequent earnings announcements.

¹⁵In Section 6.4, we demonstrate that our findings remain robust when using alternative windows to define $\mathbb{1}_{msg}$.

3.1. Lottery Stock Returns

Our hypothesis is that social interactions contribute to the high valuations of stocks with high levels of lotteryiness. We therefore predict that such stocks will experience lower abnormal returns in the following months as prices correct. We test this hypothesis by adopting an event study framework using panel regressions. This approach takes advantage of daily variations in a stock's lotteryiness and the dynamic nature of StockTwits activities.

We first assess whether the panel regression methodology generates results comparable to those obtained with the Fama-MacBeth approach used by [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#). As a baseline specification, we estimate the following panel regressions of returns following a stock's MAX event:

$$R_{i,t+1} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \text{MAXRET}_{it} + \lambda_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (1)$$

where R is the cumulative returns for stock i over 21, 42, and 63 trading days post-MAX event. MAXRET is the stock return on the MAX event day. $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of lagged control variables, following [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#), [Fama and French \(2015\)](#) and [Hou, Xue, and Zhang \(2015\)](#).¹⁶ We include firm and year-month fixed effects to account for omitted firm characteristics and marketwide shocks and cluster the standard errors by firm and year-month.

The regression is estimated over the period 2010–2022, for which the StockTwits data are available. The results, presented in Appendix Table A5, indicate that the coefficient of MAXRET is negative and highly significant, consistent with the Fama-MacBeth results (Panel B of Appendix Table A2). Given the advantages of the panel regression methodology—its applicability to daily event-study setting and its ability to incorporate

¹⁶ $\mathbf{X}$ includes the market beta (BETA), the natural logarithm of firm size (SIZE), the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW), as detailed in Section 2.3.

firm and time fixed effects to account for omitted factors—our subsequent tests employ panel regressions unless otherwise noted.

As discussed in the introduction, we hypothesize that social interactions contribute to the pricing of lottery stocks by: (1) stimulating optimism about a stock with high lotteryiness, and (2) making a stock more lottery-like. To test the first of these hypotheses, we next examine whether StockTwits message activity in days leading up to a MAX event influences the relationship between MAXRET and the stock’s subsequent returns. We define a high-message indicator, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$, which equals one if the number of StockTwits messages during the $[-11, 0]$ window belongs to the top 10 percent of the distribution, and zero otherwise.

Extending equation (1), we estimate the following panel regression:

$$R_{i,t+1} = \lambda_0 + \beta \text{MAXRET}_{it} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg_{it}} + \lambda_1 \text{MAXRET}_{it} + \lambda_2 \mathbb{1}_{mssg_{it}} + \lambda_3 X_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}. \quad (2)$$

The variable of interest is the interaction term, $\text{MAXRET} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$, which captures how StockTwits message activity modulates the relation between MAXRET and subsequent returns. As before, we include firm and year-month fixed effects to account for omitted firm characteristics and cluster the standard errors by firm and year-month.

The results are presented in Table 2. Column 1 indicates that the coefficient for the interaction term, $\text{MAXRET} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$, is -0.146 (t -statistic $= -3.55$) for the $[1, 21]$ post-MAX return. This negative relationship persists for longer horizons, with coefficients ranging from -0.170 to -0.248 for 42- and 63-day cumulative returns (columns 2 and 3).¹⁷ Economically, a one standard-deviation increase in MAXRET is associated with an additional 136 to 231 basis point decrease in future returns over one to three months for stocks with high StockTwits activity.

¹⁷Control variables SIZE, IA, OP, REV, and COSKEW have significant coefficients consistent with past literature (Fama and French, 2015; Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2015; Jegadeesh, 1990; Harvey and Siddique, 2000). Robustness tests using the data of Cookson and Niessner (2023), available 2010–2021, yield similar results, with $\text{MAXRET} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$ coefficients of -0.122 , -0.181 , and -0.257 for one-, two-, and three-month-ahead returns (Appendix Table A6). We thank Tony Cookson and Marina Niessner for sharing their data.

A key finding is that including $\mathbb{1}_{msg}$ and its interaction with MAXRET fully absorbs the effect of MAXRET itself—the MAXRET coefficients are negative but substantially smaller in absolute magnitude and are no longer significant. These findings, coupled with the highly significant negative slope coefficients for $\text{MAXRET} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{msg}$, suggest that social interactions could be a key factor contributing to the underperformance of lottery stocks in our sample.

3.2. Subsequent Earnings Announcement Returns

Another way to test for overvaluation is to estimate stock price corrections at the dates of subsequent earnings announcements. If lottery stocks are overpriced, the arrival of fundamental news should induce price corrections with magnitudes commensurate with initial overvaluation levels. We therefore hypothesize that these corrections will be more pronounced for lottery stocks that experienced higher levels of social interaction activity.

To test this prediction, we calculate the DGTW ([Daniel et al. 1997](#)) cumulative abnormal returns over the three days surrounding the earnings announcement, denoted as CAR (see, for example, [Frazzini 2006](#); [Kaniel et al. 2012](#)). We link each MAX event to the subsequent earnings announcement and estimate equation (2) with CAR as the dependent variable. (When multiple MAX events occur between two consecutive earnings announcements, we retain only the MAX event closest in time to the latter announcement.) The results are presented in Appendix Table A7.

As a benchmark for comparison, we first present the regression without the StockTwits message indicator in column 1. The coefficient of MAXRET is -0.030 and highly significant, indicating that high MAXRET stocks tend to experience disappointing earnings announcements in the following quarter. These results are consistent with [Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff \(2018\)](#), who find increased returns to anomaly portfolios on earnings announcement days and other corporate news days. They argue that this phenomenon indicates that information arrival plays a role in rectifying investors' biased expectations.

We then introduce the StockTwits message indicator and its interaction term with MAXRET, with message activities measured over the $[-11, 0]$ window. The variable of interest is the interaction term, $\text{MAXRET} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\text{msg}}$. In column 2, the coefficient is significantly negative, with a value of -0.025 . Given the baseline coefficient of MAXRET at -0.021 (t -statistic $= -3.07$), this indicates that MAX events associated with very high pre-event message volume tend to be followed by earnings announcement returns in the next quarter that are 119% ($= -0.025 / -0.021$) more negative than for other MAX events.

This result supports our hypothesis that extensive social media discussions in the days leading up to a MAX event promote optimistic investor beliefs about the lottery stock, resulting in greater disappointment upon the future release of earnings news. This evidence is consistent with the implications of the social interaction models of [Hirshleifer \(2020\)](#), [Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden \(2022\)](#), and [Pedersen \(2022\)](#).

A caveat to our analysis is that the message activity indicator is defined over the $[-11, 0]$ window, as motivated by the theoretical models discussed earlier. Omitted variables could be correlated with both MAX event date message activity and MAX event date returns, potentially driving our results. The inclusion of firm and year-month fixed effects, as well as a rich list of known return predictors, mitigate this concern by controlling for time-invariant firm characteristics and for common market-wide shocks. To provide further insight and to address potential endogeneity concerns, in the next section we also explore the underlying mechanisms for our main findings.

4. Mechanisms

In this section, we explore the implication of theoretical models that social interactions can cause a stock to become a lottery stock and that social interactions trigger more aggressive retail buying of lottery stocks. We therefore test whether social interactions predict the likelihood of lottery event occurrence and investor trading behavior around these events. Since these are predictive tests, they are not subject to endogeneity deriving from correlated contemporaneous variables nor from reverse causality from the dependent variable to the independent variable.

4.1. The Emergence of Lottery Stocks

We begin by testing whether StockTwits message activity predicts both the probability of stocks experiencing lottery events and the extremity of their lottery characteristics, as measured by the event-day returns.

Previous studies of lottery stocks have mostly taken the stock's lotteriness as given and have focused on subsequent returns. There has been little exploration of the predictors of becoming a lottery stock and why lottery characteristics change over time.¹⁸ Motivated by the models of [Hirshleifer \(2020\)](#), [Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden \(2022\)](#), and [Pedersen \(2022\)](#), we propose that social interactions contribute to a stock becoming more lottery-like, and that social interactions that direct investor attention to such stocks stimulate overoptimism about its future payoffs. Our evidence in Figure 2 of a substantial rise in message activity even before a lottery event is consistent with this perspective.

We formally test this hypothesis by examining the extent to which social interactions, as measured by StockTwits message counts, contribute to both the likelihood of a stock becoming lottery-like (the extensive margin) and the magnitude of its lotteriness (the intensive margin).

To investigate the extensive margin, we estimate the following panel regressions with all stock-day observations in our sample:

$$\mathbb{1}_{i,t+1}^{lottery} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \mathbb{1}_{mssg,it}^{preEvent} + \lambda_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (3)$$

where $\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$, the lottery event indicator, takes a value of one if a stock experiences a lottery event for a given day (day 0), and zero otherwise. The primary independent variable of interest is the pre-MAX event message indicator, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$, which equals one if the message counts during the $[-11, -1]$ window exceeds the top 10% of the cross-sectional distribution, and zero otherwise. $\mathbf{X}$ denotes Return, the cumulative return during the $[-11, -1]$ window, and the vector of control variables specified in equation

¹⁸Previous studies have examined the extent to which investors' preference for lottery attributes is influenced by persistent socioeconomic factors such as education, religion, and household income ([Kumar 2009](#); [Han and Kumar 2013](#); [Bali et al. 2023](#)).

(2), lagged by one month. We include firm and year-month fixed effects and use standard errors clustered by firm and year-month.

The results are presented in Table 3. The slope coefficient (scaled by 100) of $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ is 0.228 in the univariate panel regression (column 1), and 0.272 after controlling for all other variables (column 2). Both coefficients are highly significant. The economic magnitude, based on the coefficient estimate in column 2, is substantial: an increase in message activity to the top decile increases the likelihood of a stock experiencing a lottery event on a given day by 0.272 percentage points, or 65% of the average probability of 0.42 percentage points across all stock days. The results indicate that elevated levels of social interaction activity is a strong predictor of the emergence of lottery stocks.¹⁹

We next investigate the intensive margin, that is, the association between StockTwits message activity and the magnitude of a stock's MAXRET on lottery event days. We estimate the following regression linking the magnitude of MAXRET with the pre-lottery event message indicator ($\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$):

$$\text{MAXRET}_{i,t+1} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \mathbb{1}_{mssg,it}^{preEvent} + \lambda_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (4)$$

where $\mathbf{X}$ denotes the vector of control variables specified in equation (3). We also include firm and year-month fixed effects.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 present the results, with two-way clustered standard errors by firm and year-month. The coefficient on $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ is positive and highly significant, suggesting that more extensive social media discussion is associated with higher lottery-event day returns. Specifically, the slope coefficient on $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ in column 4 implies that a stock that has experienced elevated StockTwits message flows before the lottery event is expected to have substantially higher levels of MAXRET, by 3.867 percentage points,

¹⁹The coefficient of $R^{preEvent}$ is significantly negative for the full sample of all stock-days (columns 1–2) but positive for the lottery event sample (columns 3–4). This is because, for the full sample, higher cumulative returns over $[-11, -1]$ reduce the likelihood of even higher returns on day 0, lowering the probability of a lottery event and yielding a negative coefficient. By contrast, in the lottery-day sample, day-0 returns exceed any single-day return in $[-11, -1]$ by construction, so $R^{preEvent}$ covaries positively with the realized lottery-day returns, producing positive coefficients in columns 3–4. Our findings remain robust when using an alternative, path-independent lottery event definition (see Subsection 6.4).

which is 17% higher than the cross-sectional lottery-day mean return of 23.0 percentage points. In summary, these results indicate that StockTwits message activity strongly predicts both the magnitude of large one-day share price run-ups and the likelihood that a stock becomes a lottery stock.

In Section 6.1, to address causality we use as instrumental variable a plausibly exogenous shock to investor social interactions: the staggered implementation of state-level social media privacy laws, which increased social media activity for firms headquartered in adopting states. The results are consistent with those in Table 3. Taken together, the evidence aligns with the predictions of the theories of [Hirshleifer \(2020\)](#), [Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden \(2022\)](#), and [Pedersen \(2022\)](#) that social interactions increase lotteriness and induce overvaluation of lottery stocks. In the next two subsections, we complement the return tests by examining investor trading behavior around lottery events.

4.2. Retail Herding on the Robinhood Trading Platform

We next test the hypothesis that social interactions trigger more aggressive retail buying of lottery stocks. Specifically, we examine whether StockTwits message activity around the time of lottery events predicts greater retail investor buying, particularly by Robinhood investors.

A notable modern type of lottery stock is the “meme stock,” whose rise in early 2021 is closely tied to investors on the Robinhood trading platform. Robinhood pioneered commission-free trading, making participation in the stock market more accessible to a wider audience, especially younger and first-time investors. This feature was crucial in attracting a large user base who were eager to trade without the financial barriers traditionally associated with brokerage services. The platform has also introduced several means of gamifying stock trading. For example, the platform added entertainment to the user experience by giving new members the ability to acquire a free share of stock by scratching off images that looked like a lottery ticket ([Popper 2020](#)).

Consequently, Robinhood emerged as the preferred trading platform for retail investors who played a pivotal role in the meme stock phenomenon. The number of active users on the platform grew from 0.5 million in 2014 to 12.5 million by 2020. [Barber et al. \(2022\)](#) examine stocks on Robinhood's Top Movers list, comprising stocks with the largest absolute percentage price changes from the previous day close. They find that Robinhood investors engage in attention-induced buying more than other retail investors, leading to increased correlation in their purchase behavior and contributing to the overvaluation of the corresponding stocks.

Motivated by these findings and the model of [Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden \(2022\)](#), which suggests that attraction to a stock can be socially transmitted, we investigate whether social interactions promote the purchase of lottery stocks by Robinhood investors.

We use stock popularity data from the Robintrack website for the period between May 2, 2018 and August 13, 2020. In the spirit of [Barber et al. \(2022\)](#), we define a herding episode as a day when the daily increase in the number of Robinhood users for a stock, measured relative to the number of users on the preceding day, ranks in the top 5% of the cross-sectional distribution of the Robinhood sample. We also require a minimum threshold of 100 new users on that day. This represents approximately 14 herding episodes per day, or 0.5% of the average number of stocks covered by the Robintrack data on a given day.²⁰

We first present graphical evidence of a stock's herding propensity around lottery events. We classify stock-day observations into two groups: the High-message group, corresponding to days when message counts belong to the top 10% of the cross-sectional distribution; and the Low-message group, which includes all other days. Figure 3 displays the frequencies of herding episodes for these two groups, as defined by the message counts of the preceding day. The figure indicates that 43.2% of lottery events following elevated StockTwits discussions on the preceding day are associated with a Robinhood herding

²⁰Due to data limitations, we do not examine herding episodes specifically associated with meme stocks in the post-2020 period.

episode, substantially exceeding the 19.1% likelihood observed for lottery events with lower message volume.

We describe statistically how StockTwits message activity around a lottery event day (day 0) relates to subsequent herding episodes using the following panel regression:

$$\text{HR}[n]_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Message}_{it} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (5)$$

where n corresponds to the lottery event day (day 0) or the post-lottery event windows of $[1, 5]$ and $[6, 10]$. The herding indicator HR equals one if a stock experiences a herding episode on day 0 (HR[0] in column 1) and zero otherwise. For columns 2 and 3, HR[1,5] and HR[6,10] represent the averages of daily herding indicators over days $[1, 5]$ and $[6, 10]$, respectively.

Table 4 presents the results. The key variable of interest is the StockTwits message activity indicator, Message. In column 1, Message is the pre-event message volume indicator $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$, which equals one if a stock's message count over $[-11, -1]$ ranks within the top 10% of the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. In columns 2 and 3, Message is the event-day message indicator $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, which equals one if the stock's day-0 message count ranks within the top 10% the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. $\mathbf{X}$ includes a vector of control variables following Barber et al. (2022).²¹ The regression includes year-month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and year-month. The t -statistics are in parentheses. We do not include firm fixed effects as an average firm has only three lottery-event observations during the sample period with available Robintrack data.

²¹The control variables include: return (Return), herding indicator (HR), log number of Robinhood users (USER), log change in users (ΔUSER), abnormal trading volume (AbVol), and abnormal news (AbNews). AbVol is the natural logarithm difference between daily share volume and its past 21-day mean. AbNews is the log difference between one plus daily Ravenpack news count and its past 21-day mean. For column 1, Return is the cumulative return over days $[-11, -1]$, and other controls are averaged over the same period. For columns 2 and 3, all controls are measured as of day 0. The earnings announcement indicator (EA) equals one if there is an earnings announcement on the MAX day, and zero otherwise. Given the short length of the panel, 27 months, and limited time-series variation, we omit firm fixed effects (Petersen 2009).

Column 1 indicates that the coefficient on the high-message indicator, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$, is 0.070 and statistically significant. In economic terms, this means that on lottery-event days, stocks with high message volumes are 7.0 percentage points more likely to experience a Robinhood herding episode—a 27% increase over the average probability of 26.3 percentage points on such days.²²

Similarly, the significant coefficient of 0.020 for $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$ in column 2 indicates that lottery events accompanied by elevated StockTwits activity raise the next-week Robinhood buy herding probability by 2.0 percentage points—a 38% rise relative to the 5.3 percentage point average for all lottery stocks in their post-event week. Column 3 indicates that there is a positive but insignificant association between message activity and herding probability over days [6, 10].

Overall, these findings indicate that more intense social media activity concerning lottery stocks predicts increased buy herding among Robinhood investors around lottery event days. This result suggests that social interactions play an important role in the attention-driven herding documented by [Barber et al. \(2022\)](#).

4.3. Aggregate Retail Trading

To assess whether the findings for Robinhood investors are indicative of retail investors more generally, we next examine the behavior of aggregate retail order flows around lottery events. Following [Boehmer et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Barber et al. \(2024\)](#), we define the volume-based retail order imbalance (OIB) for stock i on day d as follows:

$$OIB_{id} = \frac{BVOL_{id} - SVOL_{id}}{BVOL_{id} + SVOL_{id}}, \quad (6)$$

where BVOL and SVOL represent the number of shares bought and sold by retail investors for stock i on day d , respectively.²³

²²Among other explanatory variables, column 1 indicates that past return, lagged herding status, and Robinhood user numbers positively predict herding likelihood, consistent with [Barber et al. \(2022\)](#).

²³The methodology uses off-exchange trades (with an exchange code equal to “D”) from the TAQ database. A trade is classified as a retail buy if the sub-penny transaction price is above the quote midpoint and as a retail sell if the transaction sub-penny price is below the quote midpoint. The mean and standard deviation of OIB on the lottery event day are 0.02 and 0.26, respectively. In comparison,

To test whether social interactions affect retail trading of lottery stocks, we modify equation (5) by using retail OIB as the dependent variable and by adding lagged OIB as a control. Table 5 presents the findings, with Panels A and B corresponding to the Robinhood and the StockTwits sample, respectively.

In Panel A, the coefficients on $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ and $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, the primary variables of interest, are positive and significant in predicting OIBs on day 0 and days [1, 5], respectively. Specifically, stocks subject to more extensive discussions on StockTwits on days [−11, −1] experience 2.66 percentage points higher net retail buys on day 0. Similarly, stocks subject to more extensive discussions on day 0 experience 1.47 percentage points higher net retail buys in the subsequent week. These increases represent 10.2% and 9.1% of their respective sample standard deviations. This effect is primarily observed during days [1, 5]. It is considerably weaker and is statistically insignificant over days [6, 10], as presented in column 3.

Panel B extends the analysis to the entire StockTwits universe, which includes eight times the number of observations used in Panel A. This panel omits the Robinhood-specific explanatory variables. While pre-event messages do not significantly predict event-day retail order imbalance (column 1), message activity more strongly predicts retail net buying in the first two weeks after the lottery event (columns 2 and 3). The delayed OIB response in the StockTwits sample, compared to the Robinhood sample, may reflect slower information diffusion about lotteriness, particularly among less visible stocks in the broader StockTwits universe.

Overall, the evidence indicates that the insights obtained from the Robinhood investor tests generalize to retail investors more broadly, including those who do not use Robinhood. Taken together, in both investor samples, elevated StockTwits message activity predicts more aggressive net retail buying of lottery stocks.

the corresponding mean and standard deviation of daily OIB for the sample of Robinhood stocks during the period from May 2, 2018 to August 13, 2020, as reported by Barber et al. (2022), are 0.01 and 0.35, respectively.

4.4. Disagreement and Trading Volume

We have seen that social interactions among investors are associated with aggregate returns and trading activities. In this subsection, we take advantage of the rich, message-level, information in our StockTwits data and explore unique implications of theories based upon social interaction in the context of lottery stocks.

For example, as discussed in the introduction, theories of social interactions suggest that word-of-mouth communication in social interactions can spread incorrect beliefs and naïve trading strategies. These effects give scope for investor disagreement regarding asset valuations. Empirically, there is evidence that social interactions trigger echo chamber effects among investors ([Cookson, Engelberg, and Mullins 2023](#)) and are associated with persistent disagreement and trading volume following earnings announcements ([Hirshleifer, Peng, and Wang 2024](#)).

Motivated by these findings, we examine how StockTwits message activity relates to investor disagreement and trading volume around lottery events. We obtain message sentiment and define disagreement (DIS) as the standard deviation of sentiment probabilities across messages for a stock-day.²⁴

Table 6 presents the results from the following panel regression using daily observations around lottery events:

$$\text{DIS}[n]_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Message}_{it} + \alpha_2 X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (7)$$

where n represents the lottery event day (day 0) or the post-lottery event windows of [1, 5] and [6, 10]. The dependent variable DIS, in percentage points, is message disagreement

²⁴We measure message sentiment with self-labeled bullish or bearish indicators provided by users (43.6% of messages). For messages without self-labels, we use the Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT), a state-of-the-art model that has demonstrated superior performance in sentiment classification ([Devlin et al. 2019](#)). Using self-labeled messages as the training sample, we use BERT to calculate a continuous sentiment score that range from 0 (bearish) to 1 (bullish). The mean and standard deviation of sentiments are 0.65 and 0.42, respectively.

on day 0 (column 1) or average daily disagreement for days [1, 5] and [6, 10] (columns 2 and 3).²⁵

The key variable of interest is the StockTwits message activity indicator. The corresponding measures, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ and $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, indicate high message count during the pre-event window $[-11, -1]$ or on day 0, respectively, as defined in Table 4. $\mathbf{X}$ represents the vector of control variables.²⁶ We include firm and year-month fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm and year-month.

The coefficients on the message indicators, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ and $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, are consistently positive across all columns and highly significant. In terms of economic magnitude, Column 1 indicates that lottery stocks that attracted high StockTwits activity over days $[-11, -1]$ experience 1.617 percentage points higher investor disagreement on day 0, or 6.6% of the sample mean. Similarly, high message activity on day 0 predicts 6.4% and 7.9% higher disagreement during days [1, 5] and [6, 10], respectively. These results suggest that social interactions intensify disagreement on the StockTwits platform.²⁷

An extensive literature proposes that investor disagreement is associated with trading volume (see, e.g., Kim and Verrecchia 1991, Harris and Raviv 1993, Kandel and Pearson 1995, and Scheinkman and Xiong 2003). We therefore examine the association of StockTwits message activity with the trading volume around lottery event days. Specifically, we estimate equation (7) with share turnover (TO, in percentage points) as the dependent variable, adding lagged TO as an additional control. Share turnover is measured as traded shares divided by shares outstanding. The mean of TO on lottery event days is

²⁵The number of observations is lower in column 3 than in column 2 because StockTwits message activity declines rapidly following a lottery event (see Figure 2, Decile 10). Since our daily disagreement measure can only be calculated when there are at least two messages, this pattern leads to more missing values for the dependent variable in the later [6, 10] window compared to the [1, 5] window.

²⁶We include Return, AbVol, AbNews, and EA (as in Table 4); lagged DIS (averaged over days $[-11, -1]$ for column 1 and measured on day 0 for columns 2–3); market beta (BETA), log market capitalization (SIZE), log book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW) (as in Table 2).

²⁷For the control variables, day 0 disagreement (column 1) is positively associated with abnormal volume, and abnormal news over days $[-11, -1]$, and is higher for growth stocks (low BM) and past winners (MOM). BM, MOM, and Return also significantly predict disagreement over the subsequent two weeks (columns 2–3).

17.70 percentage points. For days [1, 5] and days [6, 10], the mean daily TO are 2.06 and 1.56 percentage points, respectively.

The results are presented in Table 7. In Column 1, the coefficient of $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ is 10.7 and highly significant. This indicates that lottery stocks with high StockTwits activity during days $[-11, -1]$ exhibit 60.5% higher trading volume on day 0 relative to the sample mean. Similarly, in columns 2 and 3, high message activity on day 0 corresponds to 42.3% and 46.2% higher trading volume (relative to the mean) over the following two weeks.

Our findings indicate that greater StockTwits discussion of lottery stocks predicts elevated trading in these stocks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to document a strong relationship between message activity, investor disagreement, and trading volume in the context of lottery stocks. This evidence suggests that social mechanisms affect belief formation and the trading dynamics of lottery stocks.

5. Headquarters Social Connectedness and Lottery Stock Returns

Using the StockTwits dataset, we have provided tests of our hypothesis that social interactions contribute to both the rise of a lottery stock and investors' attraction to such stocks. This is informative, as StockTwits is the largest finance-specific social media platform, and because the granular, message-level of the data enables us to directly map social interaction activity with market outcomes such as stock returns, aggressive net buying by retail investors (especially Robinhood investors), disagreement, and aggregate trading volume. Nevertheless, the question arises of how representative the activity and opinions expressed on the platform are of trading decisions in the general retail investor population.

In this section, we complement these tests by using an alternative measure of social interactions that is representative at the population scale. We adopt the Facebook Social Connectedness Index (Bailey et al. 2018b) as an alternative measure of the extent of investors' social interaction. The Facebook Social Connectedness Index (SCI) is the

friendship probability that a Facebook user in county i is friends with a user in county j .²⁸ Using this measure, we examine whether the social connectedness of a lottery stock's headquarters location contributes to investor attraction to the stock.

Specifically, we perform tests of the association between social connections and returns to lottery stocks, based on the social connectedness of the stock's headquarters county to investors in the rest of the US. There is extensive evidence that investors are more attentive to nearby firms and are more likely to invest in and trade these firms' stocks.²⁹ As investors discuss their gains from investing in local stocks, particularly those with lottery-like characteristics, news about these stocks spreads from local investors to those in other counties through word-of-mouth. Consequently, such stocks tend to be extensively discussed among a wider range of investors. As theorized in the aforementioned models (Han, Hirshleifer, and Walden 2022, Pedersen 2022), such a tendency for more intense social interactions regarding the focal stock causes greater investor attraction to stocks that have produced extreme positive returns.

Motivated by these models, we hypothesize that lottery events experienced by stocks in highly connected counties will be associated with higher valuations and lower future returns. To test this hypothesis, we measure the social connectedness of a stock's headquarters county (SCIH) as the sum of the SCIs between that county and all other US counties (including the headquarters county itself). SCIH therefore serves as a proxy for the strength of social ties between the stock's headquarters county and the rest of the U.S. A higher value of SCIH implies that a lottery stock is more likely to be discussed by a broader set of investors, thereby triggering a stronger demand.

We then modify equation (2) by replacing $\mathbb{1}_{msg}$ with SCIH and estimate the model for the same sample period. Table 8 presents the results. The coefficients of $\text{MAXRET} \cdot \text{SCIH}$

²⁸Formally, $\text{SCI}_{ij} = \frac{\text{Connections}_{ij}}{\text{Users}_i \cdot \text{Users}_j}$, where Connections_{ij} is the total number of Facebook friendship links between counties i and j , and Users_i and Users_j denote the number of Facebook users in counties i and j , respectively. We obtained the 2016 SCI measure from Facebook.

²⁹See, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Huberman (2001), Ivković and Weisbenner (2005), Ivković and Weisbenner (2007), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008), Massa and Simonov (2006), Seasholes and Zhu (2010), and Hong et al. (2014). Additionally, there is a notable local bias in Google searches for firms' stock tickers (Chi and Shanthikumar 2017).

are consistently negative and significant in predicting one-, two-, and three-month-ahead stock returns. The coefficient in column 1 suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in MAXRET is associated with more negative one-month-ahead returns, by 85 basis points, for stocks in the highest SCIH decile compared to those in the lowest decile.³⁰ The corresponding values are 114 and 121 basis points for two- and three-month-ahead returns, respectively.

The results are consistent with our hypothesis that lottery stocks headquartered in socially connected areas are more likely to be overvalued and, therefore, more likely to exhibit lower subsequent returns.

6. Further Tests

In this section, we provide further tests to strengthen identification, address alternative explanations for our findings, and confirm robustness. We first exploit exogenous shocks to social interactions to address causality. We then perform tests to compare the effects of social interactions with those of traditional investor attention measures examined in past research. Finally, we test for robustness of the results to alternative definitions of lottery-like stocks and events, as well as to specifications that include additional controls for the information environment and arbitrage costs.

6.1. Exogenous Shocks to Social Interactions

We first address identification by using exogenous regulatory shocks to social interactions. Specifically, we exploit the staggered implementation of state-level social media privacy laws, which increased social media activity, to test whether social interactions trigger lottery events.

Beginning in 2012, U.S. states enacted legislation to protect the personal social media accounts of employees and job applicants from employer intrusion. These laws generally prohibit employers from requesting or requiring disclosure of passwords to personal ac-

³⁰This is calculated as the product of the standard deviation of MAXRET (9.32%), the difference in average SCIH between the top and bottom deciles (3.95), and the slope coefficient of MAXRET·SCIH (−0.023) from column 1.

counts, demanding access to such accounts, or taking adverse employment actions based on an individual's refusal to provide such access. The laws were adopted in response to growing concerns about employer intrusion into the private online activities of employees.

By mitigating concerns of employees about employer surveillance, the laws created an environment in which individuals feel more secure engaging in online discussions. This increased freedom of expression plausibly stimulates more social interactions, making the laws a relevant instrument for social media activity.

Appendix Table A8 presents details on the timing and implementation of these laws across the U.S. states.³¹ During our sample period, 26 states implemented such laws, affecting 44% of the firms in our sample. The adoption of these laws is staggered over time, providing substantial cross-sectional and time-series variations in users' freedom of online expressions and, therefore, variations in the intensity of their social media activities.

We employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, using these privacy law implementations as an instrument for StockTwits messaging activity. Our instrumental variable, SMP, is an indicator that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a state with an active social media privacy law in a given year, and zero otherwise. Using this instrument, we examine whether intense StockTwits discussions lead to lottery events, complementing the OLS results reported in Table 3. Table 9 presents the 2SLS results. In the full sample of stock-day observations (columns 1–2), the first-stage (column 1) reports that SMP significantly increases $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$, an indicator for when StockTwits message volume is in the top 10% of the cross-sectional distribution, after controlling for firm and year-month fixed effects and other stock characteristics. The coefficient of 0.014 ($t = 2.87$) implies a 1.4 percentage point increase in this probability, or 14% of the sample mean. The first-stage F -statistic of 1,839.7 exceeds conventional thresholds (Stock and Yogo 2005), confirming instrument relevance.

³¹We use data from the Seyfarth Shaw's Social Media Privacy Legislation Survey (<https://www.seyfarth.com/a/web/7266/131317SocialMediaSurveyM13.pdf>), supplemented with additional search to identify implementation dates and the legal code sections in which each law is recorded.

The second stage (column 2) indicates that instrumented $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ predicts lottery events, with a coefficient of 2.790 ($t = 2.54$). In economic terms, a one-standard-deviation increase (0.204) in the first-stage fitted $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ corresponds to a 0.57 percentage point increase in the probability of a lottery event the next day ($= 0.204 \cdot 2.79$), which is 1.36 times the mean of 0.42 percentage points across all stock days. For comparison, the OLS estimates in Table 3 imply that crossing the top-10% message threshold increases this probability by 0.27 percentage points. Together, these results support the hypothesis that social media activity promotes the emergence of lottery stocks.³²

Columns 3 and 4 report results for the lottery-event day sample and describe the magnitude of returns on these event days. In the first stage (column 3), SMP continues to increase StockTwits activity, with an F -statistic of 12.7. While this exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 suggested by [Staiger and Stock \(1997\)](#), it remains below the more stringent 16.38 cutoff proposed by [Stock and Yogo \(2005\)](#), indicating a potentially weak instrument. The second stage (column 4) yields an insignificant coefficient on instrumented social media activity ($\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$), likely reflecting weak instrument and the smaller event-day sample. Because these specifications condition on realized lottery events, selection may compromise instrument validity. We therefore treat columns 3–4 as descriptive associations rather than causal effects. Nevertheless, these estimates are informative about within-lottery-day covariation between pre-event messaging and outcomes and the positive point estimates are consistent with the view that social media activity amplifies lottery-like characteristics.

6.2. Social Interactions versus Traditional Attention Measures

A potential concern is that our StockTwits message volume may primarily reflect general investor attention rather than genuine social interactions. To address this issue, we control for two established attention measures: abnormal Google search volume (ASV),

³²It is well-established that IV estimates often have larger magnitudes than OLS estimates (e.g., [Card 2001](#), [Jiang 2017](#)). This may be due to the attenuation of OLS estimates from measurement error or endogeneity ([Angrist and Krueger, 2001](#)), or because IV captures a Local Average Treatment Effect for a highly responsive ‘complier’ population ([Imbens and Angrist, 1994](#)).

which primarily captures retail investor attention, and Bloomberg daily maximum readership (DMR), which represents institutional investor attention.³³

We augment the stock return regression model of Table 2 by including ASV and DMR, which are measured as the daily average over the window $[-11, 0]$ relative to the MAX event day (day 0). The corresponding results are reported in Table 10, Panel A. The interaction between MAX returns and StockTwits activity remains highly significant across all horizons, with coefficients ranging from -0.162 to -0.263 , which are comparable to the baseline results.

Interestingly, we find that the two attention measures exhibit distinct effects in modulating the MAX-return relationship. The MAX·ASV interaction is insignificant, suggesting that retail attention captured through Google searches does not influence the return reversals of lottery stocks. In contrast, the MAX·DMR interaction is positive and statistically significant, with coefficients ranging from 0.080 to 0.141 .

This result provides a more nuanced picture of market dynamics. It suggests that different investor types react to lottery stocks in opposing ways. While social media fuels retail-driven demand, promoting overpricing, the positive coefficient on the MAX·DMR interaction indicates that institutional attention attenuates this overvaluation. These findings are consistent with institutional investors acting as the “smart money,” potentially arbitraging against retail-driven mania and pushing prices toward fundamental values.³⁴

Similarly, we augment the lottery event prediction model of Table 3 with controls for pre-event averages of ASV and DMR. As seen in Table 10, Panel B, the coefficient

³³These measures were introduced by [Da, Engelberg, and Gao \(2011\)](#) and [Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen \(2017\)](#), respectively. The first measure, ASV, is defined as the difference between Google’s search popularity score for a given ticker symbol and its one-year lagged mean, scaled by the mean. To avoid spillover from recent events, we exclude the most recent month when computing the mean. The ASV sample covers the period from July 2004 to December 2022. The second measure, DMR, is available from February 2010 to December 2022. The Bloomberg data track hourly user activity (including search and readership) for each stock relative to the same stock’s activity over the preceding 30 calendar days. DMR is an ordinal measure, taking the value of zero, one, two, three, or four depending on whether the day’s maximum hourly activity falls below the 80th percentile, between the 80th and 90th, between the 90th and 94th, between the 94th and 96th, or above the 96th percentile of the stock’s historical distribution.

³⁴Consistent with this, [Bali and Weigert \(2024\)](#) find that hedge funds trade high idiosyncratic volatility (lottery-like) stocks profitably by buying high volatility stocks when they are underpriced and selling them when they are overpriced.

on $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ remains highly significant, with its magnitude for predicting lottery event probability (0.247) and event returns (3.598) staying similar to the baseline estimates reported in Table 3. While both ASV and DMR also positively predict lottery events, their inclusion does not diminish the role of StockTwits messaging.

Together, these results reinforce our interpretation that social media activity captures a distinct influence on investor behavior that differs from the effects of independent information-seeking as measured by retail search volume or institutional readership.

6.3. Alternative Lottery Measure

To assess whether our findings are specific to the MAX measure, we construct a lottery index, LTRY, adapted from Kumar (2009). LTRY captures three key features that make stocks lottery-like from the perspective of retail investors: high idiosyncratic volatility, high idiosyncratic skewness, and low nominal price.³⁵

Appendix Table A9 examines the degree of overpricing of lottery stocks. As in Table 2, the interaction between LTRY and StockTwits activity ($LTRY \cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$) significantly predicts negative future returns across all horizons. The coefficients range from -0.127 to -0.365 . These are economically meaningful magnitudes: a one-decile-rank increase in LTRY is associated with an additional 12.7 to 36.5 basis-point decrease in future returns over one to three months for stocks with high StockTwits activities. Also consistent with Table 2, the standalone lottery rank is insignificant, reinforcing the idea that social interactions are a key contributor to the subsequent underperformance of lottery stocks.

Appendix Table A10 further examines whether social media activity predicts lottery events defined based on LTRY. We classify a lottery event as a stock falling into the

³⁵For each month, we sort stocks into 50 bins by price per share (PRC) in descending order, such that stocks in the lowest bin (i.e., a PRC portfolio rank of 1) have the highest price per share and those in the highest bin (i.e., a PRC portfolio rank of 50) have the lowest price per share. We also independently sort stocks into 50 bins by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and idiosyncratic skewness (ISKEW) in ascending order. IVOL and ISKEW are, respectively, the standard deviation and the skewness of residuals from the time-series regression of daily stock returns against the daily market, size, and book-to-market factors in a month. The three ranks are summed to create a composite lottery index (SumRank). By construction, the lottery index, SumRank, has an integer value ranging from 3 to 150, and higher values indicate stronger lottery-like characteristics. Finally, we define LTRY as decile rank of SumRank, with the highest decile ($LTRY = 10$) representing the most lottery-like stocks.

top LTRY decile in a given month and define $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preMonth}$ as equal to one if lagged monthly message volume ranks in the top 10% cross-sectionally. The results indicate that $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preMonth}$ significantly predicts the probability of lottery events (coefficients of 0.022 to 0.029). The economic magnitude is substantial: high social media activity increases the probability of lottery classification by 2.9 percentage points, a 29% increase relative to the baseline monthly probability of 10%.

Taken together, these results indicate that our main finding, that social interactions contribute to the emergence of lottery stocks, is robust to the alternative lottery demand proxy proposed by [Kumar \(2009\)](#).

6.4. Additional Robustness Checks

This subsection provides additional robustness checks, indicating that the main findings remain similar with alternative windows over which we measure message activity, after controlling for information environment, information supply, arbitrage costs, and for alternative definitions of lottery events.

Alternative message windows We construct versions of Table 2 using alternative definitions of StockTwits message indicator, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$, based on shorter pre-event windows: $[-5, 0]$, $[-3, 0]$, and $[-1, 0]$. The results, presented in Appendix Table A11, confirm that our main conclusion is not sensitive to this choice. In all specifications, the coefficient on the key interaction term, $\text{MAXRET} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$, remains negative and statistically significant, with only one exception in the shortest $[-1, 0]$ window. While the magnitude of the effect slightly attenuates as the measurement window shortens, with coefficients ranging from -0.103 to -0.192 for the $[-5, 0]$ window and from -0.083 to -0.136 for the $[-1, 0]$ window, the results remains economically and statistically meaningful, reinforcing the findings from Table 2.

Information environment and information supply Our findings so far suggest that social interactions help direct investor attention to lottery stocks and therefore contribute

to lottery demand. We next test whether this effect is not driven by a stock's information environment as measured by the number of analysts covering a stock (e.g., [Hou and Moskowitz 2005](#); [Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000](#)) or by information supply, as captured by news coverage.

We obtain analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S for 1976–2022 and define CVRG as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts covering a firm. For information supply, we use the number of relevant news reports (NEWS) from Ravenpack. We estimate equation (2) with CVRG or NEWS as additional controls and present the results in Appendix Table A12, Panels A and B. The average slope coefficients on the MAXRET and $\mathbb{1}_{msg}$ interaction remain significantly negative, with magnitudes similar to those in Table 2. This evidence suggests that our main finding on the relation between social interactions and lottery stock returns is not driven by information environment or information supply.

Arbitrage costs High arbitrage barriers discourage investors from trading, thereby allowing mispricing to persist (see, for example, [Shleifer and Vishny 1997](#)). We therefore consider to what extent the result in Table 2 is driven by arbitrage costs.

We measure arbitrage costs in two ways: idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and an arbitrage cost index (COST).³⁶ We then estimate equation (2) with the inclusion of IVOL or COST as an additional control variable and present the results in Panels C and D of Appendix Table A12, respectively. We find that the average slope coefficients on MAXRET $\cdot \mathbb{1}_{msg}$ are significantly negative and remain similar to the corresponding results reported in Table 2. Hence, the results suggest that arbitrage costs do not explain our main finding.

³⁶Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is a common proxy for arbitrage risk (e.g., [Pontiff 2006](#); [Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 2015](#)), though it is also associated with scope for mispricing pressure. Following [Ang et al. \(2006\)](#), IVOL is estimated from stock-level time-series regressions of daily excess stock returns (with a minimum of 15 daily observations) against the daily Fama-French market, size, and book-to-market factors during the portfolio formation month. We measure COST following [Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan \(2012, 2015\)](#): each month, stocks are independently sorted into deciles on six characteristics—institutional ownership, market capitalization, analyst coverage, and CRSP age (all in descending order), and Amihud illiquidity and idiosyncratic volatility (in ascending order). We assign decile ranks (1–10) for each characteristic and define COST as the arithmetic mean of the available ranks, requiring at least three non-missing characteristics.

Alternative lottery event definition So far, our definition of a lottery event on a given day depends on a stock experiencing a MAX event on that day, where MAX event occurs when a stock's return on that day is the highest over a trailing 21-trading-day window. As explained in Subsection 2.1, we use this definition of MAX events because it is the natural generalization of the specification used in previous papers that examine lottery effects (i.e., BCW) while only using backward-looking data to construct the predictor. This allows us to compare our results with the previous literature and evaluate the role of social interaction variables in modulating the relation between MAXRET and future returns (Table 2).

A potential concern with this measure is that it is possible that omitted shocks to the stock over the pre-event period may influence both MAXRET and message volume and therefore drive some of our findings. To address this possible source of endogeneity, we perform robustness checks using two further possible definitions of lottery event.

The first is a path-independent lottery event definition. For each stock i and each day t , we compute its maximum daily return over $[t - 20, t]$. We then define a lottery event for stock i on day t if the stock's return on day t exceeds the 90th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of these rolling maxima. Because the cutoff is set cross-sectionally rather than from the stock's own return history, this definition is path independent and thus alleviating the endogeneity concern noted above.

Our second alternative measure defines a MAX event using the $[t - 32, t - 12]$ return window, which ensures there is no overlap with the pre-event message window. Specifically, a MAX event is defined as occurring when a stock's return on day t is equal to or greater than its highest single-day return over the $[t - 32, t - 12]$ window. A stock experiences a lottery event if it has a MAX event and the MAX-day return (MAXRET) falls within the top 10% compared to the highest single-day return of all stocks in their respective $[t - 32, t - 12]$ windows.

We reproduce our key tests, Tables 2–5, using the alternative lottery definitions and present the results in Appendix Tables A13–A16. The results in these tables are consistent

with those in the main text. This indicates that our main findings are robust to the alternative lottery definitions.³⁷

7. Conclusion

We explore here the hypothesis that social interactions promote investor attention to and demand for lottery stocks, and thereby the formation and amplification of lottery stock bubbles. Based on a variety of tests using data from two types of social media and multiple outcome variables (extreme return realizations, subsequent stock returns and earning announcement returns, retail buying, particularly by Robinhood users, investor disagreement proxies, and trading volume), our evidence lends support to recent social finance models of bubbles.

While most previous studies take a stock's lotteriness as given, we show that social interactions, measured by StockTwits message volume, predict a higher likelihood of a stock becoming a lottery stock. Exploiting the staggered adoption of state-level social media privacy laws as an exogenous shock, we find that the effect of StockTwits activity on the probability of a lottery event is likely causal.

Our tests also provide new insights into the source of the lottery stock anomaly documented in past research. A key finding from our 2010-2022 sample is that the predictive power of both the maximum recent daily return and the composite lottery index is almost entirely concentrated among stocks with high StockTwits message volume.

Crucially, our findings distinguish the effect of social interactions from effects deriving from attention as proxied, for example, by Google search volume or institutional Bloomberg readership. The evidence indicates that it is the attention generated through social interaction, rather than the passive, non-interactive attention captured by tradi-

³⁷Under the “non-overlapping” definition (Appendix Table A13, Panel B), the coefficient on the stand-alone MAXRET becomes -0.078 and significant, whereas it is -0.052 and insignificant in our main specification (Table A13). By construction, this approach defines MAX events using the $[t - 32, t - 12]$ window and then matches them with message activity from the subsequent $[t - 11, t - 1]$. This temporal separation weakens the variable of interest, $\text{MAXRET} \times \mathbb{1}_{\text{msg}}$, biasing against finding a significant result. Despite the greater stringency of this test, the coefficient on our key variable remains large, negative, and significant.

tional proxies, that modulates the negative relation between a stock's lottery characteristics and its subsequent returns. So social interaction is a key driver of cross-sectional return predictability.

We complement the StockTwits-based tests using Facebook's social connectivity data between users' county locations. We find that lottery stocks of firms headquartered in more socially connected counties experience more negative subsequent-month returns than for firms in less-connected counties. This suggests that the social connectivity of investors in a stock's headquarter county contributes to the overvaluation of lottery stocks.

Overall, our findings highlight the relationship between social interaction and investor demand for lottery stocks. Although our sample begins in 2010, the attraction of investors to lottery-like payoffs is not new. Historically, such attraction was likely transmitted more slowly through spatially localized word-of-mouth meetings. In the modern era, social media act as a powerful catalyst, propagating investment ideas and excitement with unprecedented speed and scale. A further likely amplifier has been the concurrent proliferation of zero-commission trading, which swept away an impediment to speculative activity.

Our findings open several promising avenues for future research. For example, do social mechanisms underlie other trading patterns and pricing anomalies? Does the topology of a social network—such as the presence of central influencers or clustered echo chambers—moderate the speed and magnitude of such effects? How do speculative narratives spread differently across platforms with very different user bases, such as wallstreetbets on Reddit (meme stock investors) versus StockTwits? Could lottery stocks promote the spread of upside stories about speculative assets such as startup stocks or cryptocurrencies? Investigating such issues is crucial for understanding asset prices and bubbles in an era increasingly shaped by online social networks.

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


Figure 1. Meme Stocks and Their Lottery-Characteristics This figure displays the prices and lottery decile rankings for the following meme stocks: AMC, GameStop (GME), Palantir (PLTR), and Tupperware (TUP), covering the period from 2020 to 2022. The lottery decile is based on the ranking of a stock's largest single-day returns within each month, with Deciles 10 representing the highest returns and Decile 1 the lowest.




Figure 2. StockTwits Activity around MAX Events This figure displays the average StockTwits message volume around MAX event days (day 0) for MAX decile portfolios. A stock experiences a MAX event on a given day if its return on that day is the highest over a trailing 21-trading day window. Decile 10 corresponds to MAX events whose MAX-day returns fall in the top 10% when compared with the highest single-day returns of all stocks in their respective trailing 21-trading-day windows. Decile 1 corresponds to MAX events with returns in the bottom 10%. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022.




Figure 3. StockTwits Activity and Robinhood Herding around Lottery Events

This figure plots the daily probability of a herding episode around lottery events (indexed so that day 0 is the event day). Lottery events are defined in Table 3. We define a herding episode as a day when the daily increase in the number of Robinhood users for a stock ranks within the top 5% of the cross-sectional distribution of the Robinhood sample, requiring a minimum threshold of 100 new users on that day. We classify each stock-day observation in the $[-3, +3]$ window around the lottery event into two groups: High-message group (preceding-day messages in top 10% of the cross-sectional distribution), and the Low-message group (all others). The figure plots herding frequency for both groups. The sample period is from July 2018 to August 2020.

Table 1
Summary statistics

Panel A presents the summary statistics of each main variable using the pooled sample of MAX events. Panel B displays the correlations (multiplied by 100) among these variables. A stock experiences a MAX event on a given day (day 0) if its return on that day is the highest over a trailing 21-trading day window. MAXRET (in percentages) refers to the MAX-event day return. R represents the cumulative return (in percentages) over the window [1, 21]. Messages is the number of StockTwits messages over the $[-11, 0]$ window. $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$ equals one when Message ranks in the top 10% of the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. The set of stock return predictors includes the market beta (BETA), the logarithm of market capitalization measured in millions of dollars (SIZE), the logarithm of book-to-market (BM), annual asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM, in percentages), past one-month return (REV, in percentages), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW).

<i>A. Descriptive Statistics</i>													
Variable	Mean	Median	Stdev	Percentile				10 th	25 th	75 th	90 th		
R	0.80	0.29	17.83					-14.58	-6.23	6.69	15.07		
MAXRET	6.42	4.41	9.32					2.00	2.86	7.24	11.96		
Messages	108.17	12.00	1631.87					0.00	3.00	39.00	123.00		
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.10	0.00	0.30					0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
BETA	1.20	1.13	0.75					0.41	0.74	1.57	2.08		
SIZE	6.56	6.55	2.16					3.74	5.00	8.02	9.39		
BM	-0.70	-0.58	0.96					-1.90	-1.23	-0.09	0.32		
IA	0.18	0.05	1.36					-0.13	-0.03	0.16	0.41		
OP	-0.01	0.02	5.10					-0.13	-0.02	0.04	0.08		
MOM	12.59	6.31	68.54					-42.24	-16.85	29.82	62.75		
REV	-1.31	-0.98	13.47					-15.12	-7.40	4.62	11.24		
ILLIQ	3.06	0.00	65.40					0.00	0.00	0.05	0.63		
COSKEW	-0.01	-0.01	0.22					-0.28	-0.15	0.13	0.26		

<i>B. Pairwise Correlations</i>													
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
(1) R	100												
(2) MAXRET	-4.3	100											
(3) Messages	0.0	10.2	100										
(4) $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-1.9	18.9	15.7	100									
(5) BETA	1.1	9.5	2.1	8.5	100								
(6) SIZE	1.0	-25.1	3.7	18.6	0.6	100							
(7) BM	0.4	1.5	-3.7	-14.7	-1.5	-33.6	100						
(8) IA	-1.2	2.1	1.7	5.2	1.8	0.5	-5.4	100					
(9) OP	0.1	-0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.4	-0.1	100				
(10) MOM	0.8	-5.3	8.3	3.3	6.2	5.2	2.9	-1.2	0.7	100			
(11) REV	0.0	-3.4	1.3	-1.7	-2.4	5.0	2.3	-2.1	0.5	22.8	100		
(12) ILLIQ	0.0	5.3	-0.3	-1.4	-2.6	-7.8	3.7	-0.5	-0.2	-1.8	-0.6	100	
(13) COSKEW	-1.1	0.7	1.5	5.3	16.7	3.9	-2.6	1.2	0.1	2.0	-0.3	-1.0	100

Table 2
Social interactions and lottery stock returns

This table reports the results of panel regressions of post-MAX returns on StockTwits message activity and lagged explanatory variables. MAX events and MAXRET are defined in Table 1. Cumulative returns are reported in percentages and are measured over windows [1, 21], [1, 42], and [1, 63], respectively. $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$ equals one when the StockTwits message count for the stock over the $[-11, 0]$ window ranks in the top 10% of the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. The control variables include the market beta (BETA), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), the natural logarithm of book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). For presentation purposes, the reported coefficients for illiquidity are multiplied by 100. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and t -statistics are shown in parentheses. $*p < .1$; $**p < .05$; $***p < .01$.

	Cumulative Returns		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
MAXRET $\cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.146*** (-3.55)	-0.170*** (-3.47)	-0.248*** (-3.62)
MAXRET	-0.052 (-1.06)	-0.078 (-1.33)	-0.102 (-1.36)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.003 (1.03)	0.003 (0.57)	0.008 (0.83)
BETA	0.001 (0.55)	0.002 (0.57)	0.001 (0.35)
SIZE	-0.027*** (-11.11)	-0.055*** (-11.60)	-0.081*** (-10.59)
BM	0.000 (0.27)	0.001 (0.38)	0.004 (1.20)
IA	-0.002 (-1.03)	-0.007** (-2.06)	-0.007* (-1.76)
OP	0.036*** (6.23)	0.057*** (5.60)	0.058*** (3.65)
MOM	-0.006** (-2.56)	-0.018*** (-4.91)	-0.026*** (-5.24)
REV	-0.021*** (-2.81)	-0.030** (-2.45)	-0.057*** (-3.45)
ILLIQ	-0.012 (-0.71)	-0.011 (-0.48)	-0.002 (-0.08)
COSKEW	-0.009 (-1.53)	-0.017* (-1.81)	-0.019* (-1.82)
Obs.	430,091	426,151	421,596
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.23	15.55	17.19

Table 3
Stocktwits message volume and lottery event prediction

This table examines whether StockTwits message volume predicts the likelihood of a stock achieving lottery status and the magnitude of its lotteriness using panel regressions. MAX events and MAXRET are defined in Table 1. A stock is then defined as experiencing a lottery event on that day if it has a MAX event and its corresponding MAXRET value also falls in the top 10% when compared with the highest single-day returns of all stocks in their respective trailing 21-trading-day windows. Columns 1 and 2 use the full sample of stock-day observations and correspond to the dependent variable, $\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$, which equals one if a stock experiences a lottery event on a given day (day 0), and zero otherwise. Columns 3 and 4 focus on a sample of stock-lottery event day observations, with the dependent variable being the lottery event day return. $\mathbb{1}^{preEvent}_{mssg}$ equals one if the StockTwits message counts mentioning the stock during the $[-11, -1]$ day window rank in the top decile of the full cross-section of stocks. $R^{preEvent}$ is the cumulative return during the $[-11, -1]$ window. The control variables include the market beta (BETA), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), the natural logarithm of book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. Coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and t -statistics are shown in parentheses. $*p < .1$; $**p < .05$; $***p < .01$.

	Sample: All days $\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$		Sample: Lottery-event days Lottery-event day return	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\mathbb{1}^{preEvent}_{mssg}$	0.228*** (10.82)	0.272*** (13.33)	3.142*** (5.81)	3.867*** (7.09)
$R^{preEvent}$	-1.033*** (-6.81)	-1.004*** (-6.78)	11.764*** (6.73)	11.258*** (6.41)
BETA		0.045*** (3.67)		-0.108 (-0.29)
SIZE		-0.296*** (-24.47)		-3.119*** (-13.60)
BM		-0.012 (-1.32)		-0.648** (-2.58)
IA		-0.020* (-1.76)		-0.656** (-2.26)
OP		-0.147*** (-4.60)		-1.199* (-1.68)
MOM		-0.127*** (-8.36)		-1.958*** (-8.69)
REV		-0.460*** (-9.00)		0.006 (0.01)
ILLIQ		0.014*** (9.12)		0.065** (2.17)
COSKEW		-0.007 (-0.26)		-1.873 (-1.64)
Obs.	9,089,756	9,089,756	38,035	38,035
Adj. R^2 (%)	0.72	0.81	6.63	7.75

Table 4
Social interactions and retail herding in lottery stocks

This table presents the results of panel regressions describing the relationship between Stock-Twits message volume around lottery events and Robinhood herding episodes. Lottery events are defined in Table 3. Column 1's dependent variable, HR[0], indicates whether stock i experiences a herding episode on the lottery event day (day 0). The key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg,i}^{preEvent}$, equals one if the stock's message volume over $[-11, -1]$ ranks in the top decile of the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 and 3 use HR[1, 5] and HR[6, 10] as dependent variables, representing average daily herding likelihood over days [1, 5] and [6, 10]. Their key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, indicates top decile message volume on day 0 of the full cross-section of stocks. Control variables are specified as follows. For column 1, Return is the cumulative return over days $[-11, -1]$, while herding indicator (HR), log number of users (USER), user changes (Δ USER), abnormal volume (AbVol), and abnormal news (AbNews) are averaged over the same period. For columns 2 and 3, all controls are measured on day 0. EA indicates earnings announcements on day 0. The sample period is from June 2018 to August 2020. The model includes year-month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and year-month. t -statistics are shown in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

	HR[0] (1)	HR[1, 5] (2)	HR[6, 10] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	0.070*** (3.34)	0.020*** (2.81)	0.008 (1.47)
Return	0.100*** (3.78)	0.030*** (4.62)	0.005 (1.05)
HR	0.606*** (19.43)	0.076*** (7.50)	0.022*** (4.32)
USER	0.033*** (7.34)	0.014*** (11.00)	0.006*** (6.53)
Δ USER	0.341** (2.13)	0.003 (0.42)	-0.006 (-1.06)
AbVol	0.009 (0.77)	-0.006*** (-3.20)	0.001 (0.83)
AbNews	-0.013 (-0.88)	-0.003 (-1.67)	-0.002* (-1.77)
EA	-0.020 (-1.13)	-0.016*** (-3.26)	-0.014*** (-5.61)
Obs.	7,981	7,947	7,946
Adj. R^2 (%)	20.66	18.41	6.30

Table 5
Social interactions and retail trading of lottery stocks

This table presents the results of panel regressions examining the relationship between Stock-Twits message volume around lottery events and subsequent retail trading. Lottery events are defined in Table 3. Column 1's dependent variable, OIB[0], is the retail order imbalance on the lottery event day (day 0). The key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg,i}^{preEvent}$, equals one if the stock's message volume over $[-11, -1]$ ranks in the top decile of the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 and 3 use OIB[1,5] and OIB[6,10] as dependent variables, representing average daily net retail order flows over days $[1, 5]$ and $[6, 10]$. Their key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, indicates top decile message volume on day 0 of the full cross-section of stocks. Control variables are specified as follows. For column 1, Return is the cumulative return over days $[-11, -1]$, while OIB, herding indicator (HR), log number of users (USER), user changes (Δ USER), abnormal volume (AbVol), and abnormal news (AbNews) are averaged over the same period. For columns 2 and 3, all controls are measured on day 0. EA indicates earnings announcements coinciding with lottery events. In Panel A, we use the Robinhood sample and include year-month fixed effects. In Panel B, we use the StockTwits sample and include firm and year-month fixed effects. The dependent variables are in percentage points. Because HR, USER, and Δ USER are not observed for the complete StockTwits sample, these variables are not included in Panel B. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year-month. t -statistics are shown in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

<i>A. Robinhood Sample: 06/2018–08/2020</i>			
	OIB[0] (1)	OIB[1,5] (2)	OIB[6,10] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	2.656*** (3.29)	1.470*** (3.46)	0.705 (1.54)
Return	-3.325*** (-2.91)	2.754*** (6.43)	0.800 (1.57)
OIB	0.039 (1.16)	0.043*** (4.45)	0.032* (1.78)
HR	0.988** (2.74)	0.894** (2.32)	1.604*** (3.24)
USER	-0.779*** (-2.94)	1.093*** (9.03)	0.804*** (5.51)
Δ USER	4.260 (1.57)	0.427 (1.12)	0.365 (1.30)
AbVol	-1.585* (-1.75)	-1.420*** (-6.78)	-1.253*** (-5.77)
AbNews	-3.790*** (-3.30)	-0.292 (-1.03)	-0.063 (-0.28)
EA	1.467* (1.82)	0.071 (0.12)	1.278 (1.67)
Obs.	7,981	7,980	7,978
Adj. R^2 (%)	1.12	2.99	1.90

<i>B. StockTwits Sample: 01/2010–12/2022</i>			
	OIB[0] (1)	OIB[1,5] (2)	OIB[6,10] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	-0.182 (-0.51)	1.590*** (7.14)	1.302*** (5.28)
Return	-2.565*** (-3.94)	1.046*** (2.72)	0.009 (0.03)
OIB	0.042*** (3.16)	0.033*** (7.09)	0.030*** (5.82)
AbVol	-0.217 (-0.64)	-0.719*** (-7.39)	-0.542*** (-6.30)
AbNews	-0.228 (-0.48)	-0.695*** (-6.52)	-0.622*** (-6.45)
EA	-0.766* (-1.78)	1.004*** (3.25)	2.024*** (5.87)
Obs.	48,327	48,094	48,041
Adj. R^2 (%)	6.73	8.13	6.71

Table 6

Social interactions and investor disagreement following lottery events

This table presents the results of panel regressions examining the relationship between StockTwits message volume around lottery events and subsequent investor disagreement. Lottery events are defined in Table 3. Column 1's dependent variable, DIS[0], is StockTwits message disagreement on the lottery event day (day 0). The key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg,i}^{preEvent}$, equals one if the stock's message volume over $[-11, -1]$ ranks in the top decile of the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 and 3 use DIS[1, 5] and DIS[6, 10] as dependent variables, representing average daily StockTwits disagreement over days [1, 5] and [6, 10]. Their key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, indicates top decile message volume on day 0 of the full cross-section of stocks. Control variables are specified as follows. For column 1, Return is the cumulative return over days $[-11, -1]$, while DIS, abnormal volume (AbVol), and abnormal news (AbNews) are averaged over the same period. For columns 2 and 3, DIS, Return, AbVol, and AbNews are measured on day 0. EA indicates earnings announcements coinciding with lottery events. We further control for lagged market beta (BETA), log market capitalization (SIZE), log book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). The dependent variables are in percentage points. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. We include firm and year-month fixed effect and cluster the standard errors by firm and year-month. *t*-statistics are shown in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

	DIS[0] (1)	DIS[1, 5] (2)	DIS[6, 10] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	1.617*** (6.35)	1.614*** (5.80)	1.899*** (6.58)
Return	0.793* (1.92)	2.757*** (6.62)	2.315*** (5.42)
DIS	0.113*** (11.12)	0.176*** (15.29)	0.123*** (9.85)
AbVol	0.583*** (2.72)	0.782*** (7.14)	0.132 (1.16)
AbNews	0.855** (2.53)	0.114 (1.05)	-0.178 (-1.47)
EA	-0.631** (-2.19)	-0.161 (-0.44)	-0.306 (-0.73)
BETA	-0.202 (-1.26)	-0.012 (-0.08)	-0.056 (-0.32)
SIZE	0.115 (0.75)	0.149 (1.01)	0.101 (0.54)
BM	-0.348** (-2.22)	-0.410*** (-2.68)	-0.421** (-2.29)
IA	0.016 (0.42)	0.027 (0.83)	0.035 (0.78)
OP	0.002 (0.17)	-0.024** (-2.34)	0.010 (0.86)
MOM	0.157*** (2.71)	0.265*** (4.09)	0.261*** (3.13)
REV	0.306 (1.10)	-0.106 (-0.37)	0.046 (0.17)
ILLIQ	-0.005 (-1.65)	-0.001 (-0.31)	0.001 (0.49)
COSKEW	-1.075 (-1.56)	-0.274 (-0.47)	0.447 (0.55)
Obs.	23,155	23,408	20,691
Adj. R^2 (%)	29.16	31.23	27.48

Table 7

Social interactions and share turnover following lottery events

This table presents the results of panel regressions examining the relationship between Stock-Twits message volume around lottery events and subsequent share turnover. Lottery events are defined in Table 3. Column 1's dependent variable, $TO[0]$, is the share turnover on the lottery event day (day 0). The key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg,i}^{preEvent}$, equals one if the stock's message volume over $[-11, -1]$ ranks in the top decile of the full cross-section of stocks, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 and 3 use $TO[1, 5]$ and $TO[6, 10]$ as dependent variables, representing average daily share turnover over days $[1, 5]$ and $[6, 10]$. Their key explanatory variable, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$, indicates top decile message volume on day 0 of the full cross-section of stocks. Control variables are specified as follows. For column 1, Return is the cumulative return over days $[-11, -1]$, while TO, abnormal volume (AbVol), and abnormal news (AbNews) are averaged over the same period. For columns 2 and 3, TO, Return, AbVol, and AbNews are measured on day 0. EA indicates earnings announcements coinciding with lottery events. We further control for lagged market beta (BETA), log market capitalization (SIZE), log book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). The dependent variables are in percentage points. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. We include firm and year-month fixed effect and cluster the standard errors by firm and year-month. t -statistics are shown in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

	TO[0] (1)	TO[1, 5] (2)	TO[6, 10] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	10.681*** (6.20)	0.890*** (15.32)	0.721*** (13.04)
Return	9.593*** (3.91)	1.163*** (10.30)	0.961*** (10.33)
TO	1.781*** (5.07)	0.384*** (50.25)	0.260*** (32.26)
AbVol	2.913*** (3.04)	-0.064*** (-5.76)	-0.124*** (-10.63)
AbNews	0.714 (0.83)	-0.058*** (-5.99)	-0.078*** (-8.22)
EA	-1.935* (-1.71)	-0.217*** (-7.76)	-0.148*** (-5.57)
BETA	0.698 (0.82)	0.032 (1.18)	0.036 (1.23)
SIZE	-7.925*** (-9.13)	-0.122*** (-5.66)	-0.140*** (-5.77)
BM	0.135 (0.17)	-0.037* (-1.68)	-0.032 (-1.36)
IA	-0.072 (-0.43)	0.010* (1.92)	0.013** (2.59)
OP	-0.036 (-1.26)	0.001 (0.63)	0.000 (0.35)
MOM	-1.970*** (-4.61)	0.083*** (6.90)	0.099*** (6.87)
REV	4.059** (2.21)	0.111** (2.23)	0.098* (1.68)
ILLIQ	-0.002** (-2.29)	-0.001 (-1.04)	-0.001 (-0.80)
COSKEW	-7.256** (-2.25)	0.003 (0.04)	0.054 (0.61)
Obs.	35,107	35,084	35,024
Adj. R^2 (%)	26.31	58.17	50.57

Table 8
Headquarters county social connectedness and lottery stock returns

This table reports the results of panel regressions of post-MAX returns on lagged explanatory variables. MAX events and MAXRET are defined in Table 1. Cumulative returns are reported in percentages and are measured over windows [1,21], [1,42], and [1,63], respectively. SCIH is the social connectedness of the stock's firm headquarters county. The control variables include the market beta (BETA), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), the natural logarithm of book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). For presentation purposes, the reported coefficients for illiquidity are multiplied by 100. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and *t*-statistics are shown in parentheses. **p* <.1; ***p* <.05; ****p* <.01.

	Cumulative Return		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
MAXRET · SCIH	-0.023** (-2.31)	-0.031** (-2.09)	-0.033* (-1.90)
MAXRET	-0.079 (-1.56)	-0.099 (-1.53)	-0.128* (-1.70)
SCIH	0.005*** (3.74)	0.007** (2.60)	0.008** (2.01)
BETA	0.000 (0.19)	0.000 (0.05)	0.000 (-0.04)
SIZE	-0.027*** (-10.94)	-0.054*** (-12.33)	-0.080*** (-12.09)
BM	0.000 (0.08)	0.000 (-0.18)	0.002 (0.60)
IA	0.000 (-0.04)	-0.001 (-1.24)	-0.003* (-1.70)
OP	0.003*** (3.52)	0.004** (2.56)	0.003* (1.87)
MOM	-0.006*** (-3.07)	-0.014*** (-4.51)	-0.021*** (-5.16)
REV	-0.019** (-2.53)	-0.034*** (-2.83)	-0.061*** (-3.76)
ILLIQ	-0.008 (-0.30)	-0.008 (-0.25)	0.008 (0.21)
COSKEW	-0.009 (-1.53)	-0.015* (-1.73)	-0.017* (-1.79)
Obs.	424,628	423,609	422,444
Adj. <i>R</i> ² (%)	11.50	16.89	18.72

Table 9
Lottery event prediction: 2SLS analysis

This table presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results using state-wide social media privacy law implementation as an instrument for social media discussion. The sample includes all stock-day observations from 2010 to 2022. Columns 1 and 3 report first-stage results where the dependent variable is $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$, an indicator equal to one if the number of Stock-Twits messages during the $[-11, -1]$ window belongs to the top 10% of the full cross-section of stocks. Columns 2 and 4 report second-stage results with lottery event dummy and MAX-day return as dependent variables, respectively. SMP equals one for firms headquartered in states that have implemented social media privacy laws protecting employee social media use from employer monitoring. Control variables include lagged values of pre-event cumulative return ($R^{preEvent}$), market beta (BETA), log firm size (SIZE), log book-to-market ratio (BM), asset growth (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), short-term reversal (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. Coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and t -statistics are shown in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

	Sample: All days		Sample: Lottery event days	
	Dependent variable		Dependent variable	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	First Stage	Second Stage	First Stage	Second Stage
	$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$	$\mathbb{1}_{lottery}$	$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$	Lottery-day return
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$		2.790** (2.54)		12.568 (0.90)
SMP	0.014*** (2.87)		0.029** (2.59)	
$R^{preEvent}$	0.153*** (15.24)	-1.406*** (-6.20)	0.027* (1.70)	9.854*** (6.49)
BETA	0.022*** (5.42)	-0.006 (-0.19)	0.031*** (4.38)	-0.221 (-0.46)
SIZE	0.004 (1.24)	-0.305*** (-17.91)	0.010* (1.81)	-3.195*** (-11.99)
BM	-0.011*** (-2.68)	0.012 (0.82)	-0.021*** (-3.53)	-0.412 (-1.13)
IA	0.016*** (5.98)	-0.064*** (-3.03)	0.020*** (2.97)	-0.847* (-1.74)
OP	-0.051*** (-5.64)	-0.023 (-0.39)	-0.032* (-1.98)	-0.839 (-0.97)
MOM	0.030*** (6.46)	-0.203*** (-5.58)	0.040*** (6.50)	-2.361*** (-3.58)
REV	0.046*** (11.07)	-0.588*** (-7.95)	0.029** (2.50)	-0.456 (-0.50)
ILLIQ	-0.001*** (-4.72)	0.016*** (8.21)	-0.001** (-2.35)	0.077** (2.11)
COSKEW	-0.012* (-1.73)	0.033 (1.15)	-0.025 (-1.45)	-1.593** (-2.49)
F-stat	1,839.7		12.7	
Obs.	8,822,343	8,822,343	35,472	35,472
Adj. R ² (%)	46.03		41.56	

Table 10
Social interactions and lottery stocks: Controlling for traditional attention measures

This table examines the relationship between StockTwits message activity and lottery stocks while controlling for alternative attention measures. Panel A examines post-MAX event returns over 21, 42, and 63 trading days. Panel B examines lottery event prediction. ASV is the abnormal Google search volume and DMR is the Bloomberg readership. For Panel A, both ASV and DMR are averaged over the $[-11, 0]$ window. For Panel B, both are measured over the pre-event window $[-11, -1]$. MAX events and MAXRET are defined in Table 1 and lottery events are defined in Table 3. $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$ equals one when the StockTwits message count for the stock over the $[-11, 0]$ window ranks in the top 10% of the full cross-section of stocks. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. All specifications include firm and year-month fixed effects and the full set of control variables. For presentation purposes, the reported coefficients for illiquidity in Panel A are multiplied by 100. All coefficients in Panel B are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and t -statistics are shown in parentheses. $*p < .1$; $**p < .05$; $***p < .01$.

<i>A. Post-MAX Event Returns</i>			
	Cumulative Returns		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
MAXRET· $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.162*** (-3.64)	-0.182*** (-3.49)	-0.263*** (-3.73)
MAXRET·ASV	0.059 (0.48)	-0.166 (-1.10)	-0.212 (-1.14)
MAXRET·DMR	0.080** (2.45)	0.114** (2.50)	0.141** (2.43)
MAXRET	-0.068 (-1.47)	-0.096* (-1.78)	-0.124* (-1.81)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.004 (1.12)	0.003 (0.65)	0.009 (0.87)
ASV	0.002 (0.27)	0.009 (1.24)	0.013 (1.42)
DMR	-0.003 (-1.60)	-0.005* (-1.87)	-0.006* (-1.81)
BETA	0.001 (0.55)	0.002 (0.59)	0.001 (0.36)
SIZE	-0.027*** (-11.21)	-0.055*** (-11.66)	-0.082*** (-10.62)
BM	0.000 (0.29)	0.001 (0.39)	0.004 (1.21)
IA	-0.002 (-1.06)	-0.007** (-2.07)	-0.007* (-1.77)
OP	0.036*** (6.24)	0.057*** (5.70)	0.059*** (3.75)
MOM	-0.006** (-2.56)	-0.018*** (-4.95)	-0.026*** (-5.25)
REV	-0.022*** (-3.00)	-0.030** (-2.47)	-0.056*** (-3.43)
ILLIQ	-0.011 (-0.66)	-0.010 (-0.45)	-0.001 (-0.04)
COSKEW	-0.009 (-1.55)	-0.017* (-1.83)	-0.019* (-1.82)
Obs.	429,002	425,079	420,526
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.23	15.57	17.20

<i>B. Lottery Event Prediction</i>		
	Sample: All days $\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$	Sample: Lottery event days Lottery-event day return
	(1)	(2)
$\mathbb{1}^{preEvent}_{mssg}$	0.247*** (12.07)	3.598*** (6.34)
$ASV^{preEvent}$	0.064** (2.10)	3.581*** (2.70)
$DMR^{preEvent}$	0.089*** (11.35)	1.010*** (3.14)
$R^{preEvent}$	-1.004*** (-6.79)	11.264*** (6.45)
BETA	0.045*** (3.64)	-0.112 (-0.30)
SIZE	-0.301*** (-24.71)	-3.167*** (-13.75)
BM	-0.012 (-1.36)	-0.644** (-2.57)
IA	-0.021* (-1.82)	-0.657** (-2.26)
OP	-0.146*** (-4.56)	-1.188* (-1.66)
MOM	-0.127*** (-8.39)	-1.983*** (-8.78)
REV	-0.461*** (-9.03)	-0.051 (-0.06)
ILLIQ	0.014*** (9.10)	0.065** (2.18)
COSKEW	-0.005 (-0.19)	-1.858 (-1.63)
Obs.	9,089,756	38,035
Adj. R^2 (%)	0.81	7.78

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Online Appendix

- Table A1 lists lottery stocks whose market capitalizations fall within the top NYSE size decile.
- Table A2 presents monthly tests of the relation of MAXRET with future stock returns using univariate portfolio sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions.
- Table A3 reports the value-weighted returns of MAXRET-based decile portfolios formed from stocks after excluding micro-cap stocks as well as with market capitalizations above the NYSE median size breakpoint.
- Table A4 compares the lottery demand effect between the pre- and post-publication periods.
- Table A5 presents panel regression tests of the relation of MAXRET with future stock returns.
- Table A6 repeats the tests in Table 2 using alternative StockTwits data shared by [Cookson and Niessner \(2023\)](#), covering 2010–2021.
- Table A7 presents the test of social interactions and lottery stock returns around future earnings announcements.
- Table A8 presents the implementation dates and statutory citations of state-level media privacy laws.
- Table A9 repeats the tests in Table 2 using an alternative lottery measure adapted from [Kumar \(2009\)](#).
- Table A10 repeats the tests in Table 3 using an alternative lottery measure adapted from [Kumar \(2009\)](#).
- Table A11 reproduces Table 2 using alternative message windows.
- Table A12 extends Table 2 by controlling investor attention, information supply, and arbitrage costs.
- Table A13 examines the robustness of Table 2 to alternative definitions of lottery events.
- Table A14 examines the robustness of Table 3 to alternative definitions of lottery events.
- Table A15 examines the robustness of Table 4 to alternative definitions of lottery events.
- Table A16 examines the robustness of Table 5 to alternative definitions of lottery events.

Table A1
Lottery stocks in the top NYSE size decile

Each portfolio formation month, stocks are sorted by MAXRET, as defined in Table 1. If a stock experiences multiple MAX events within a month, its MAXRET is assigned the highest value observed that month. Lottery stocks are defined as those in the top decile of the monthly MAXRET distribution. This table lists lottery stocks whose market capitalizations fall within the top NYSE size decile in each portfolio formation month from 2010 to 2022. A total of 148 such stock-month observations are identified during this period. The last two columns report the average daily abnormal Google search volume (ASV) over the window from day -11 to day 0 (the MAXRET day), and an indicator for abnormal StockTwits activity ($\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$) over the same period, which equals 1 if the number of StockTwits messages during the window ranks in the top 10% of the cross-sectional distribution of all stock-day observations, and 0 otherwise.

DATE	Company Name	Ticker Symbol	ASV	$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$
1/31/2018	ABBVIE INC	ABBV	57.31%	1
12/31/2013	ADOBE SYSTEMS INC	ADBE	21.76%	1
8/31/2018	AUTODESK INC	ADSK	N/A	1
4/30/2014	ALLERGAN INC	AGN	48.26%	0
10/30/2020	ALIGN TECHNOLOGY INC	ALGN	N/A	1
7/31/2013	ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC	ALXN	N/A	1
1/31/2014	ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC	ALXN	N/A	1
12/31/2020	ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC	ALXN	N/A	0
5/31/2016	APPLIED MATERIALS INC	AMAT	20.86%	1
4/30/2012	AMAZON COM INC	AMZN	8.24%	1
1/30/2015	AMAZON COM INC	AMZN	32.96%	1
4/30/2015	AMAZON COM INC	AMZN	25.80%	1
10/31/2017	AMAZON COM INC	AMZN	24.96%	1
11/30/2021	ARISTA NETWORKS INC	ANET	33.65%	0
4/30/2014	ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP	APC	2.52%	1
7/31/2013	ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC	ATVI	-44.22%	1
2/28/2017	ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC	ATVI	59.39%	1
1/31/2022	ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC	ATVI	16.37%	1
11/30/2020	AMERICAN EXPRESS CO	AXP	-1.73%	1
8/31/2011	BANK OF AMERICA CORP	BAC	-19.57%	1
4/29/2011	BIOGEN IDEC INC	BIIB	N/A	1
7/31/2014	BIOGEN IDEC INC	BIIB	N/A	1
7/31/2018	BIOGEN INC	BIIB	3.63%	1
10/31/2019	BIOGEN INC	BIIB	N/A	1
2/28/2020	BIOGEN INC	BIIB	22.69%	1
11/30/2020	BIOGEN INC	BIIB	35.08%	1
6/30/2021	BIOGEN INC	BIIB	41.37%	1
9/30/2022	BIOGEN INC	BIIB	N/A	1
5/29/2015	BROADCOM CORP	BRCM	38.09%	1
7/31/2015	CHUBB CORP	CB	-3.69%	0
1/31/2019	CELGENE CORP	CELG	23.64%	1
6/30/2015	CIGNA CORP	CI	2.44%	1
8/31/2010	SALESFORCE COM INC	CRM	-1.83%	1
11/30/2010	SALESFORCE COM INC	CRM	8.80%	1
8/31/2020	SALESFORCE COM INC	CRM	22.64%	1

Appendix A1 - continued

DATE	Company Name	Ticker Symbol	ASV	$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$
1/31/2017	C S X CORP	CSX	24.12%	1
5/28/2021	DOORDASH INC	DASH	0.19%	1
1/31/2013	DELL INC	DELL	-0.79%	0
5/31/2022	DOLLAR TREE INC	DLTR	N/A	1
9/30/2020	DOCUSIGN INC	DOCU	28.68%	1
6/30/2021	DOCUSIGN INC	DOCU	8.66%	1
7/30/2021	DEXCOM INC	DXCM	N/A	0
10/31/2022	DEXCOM INC	DXCM	N/A	0
4/30/2012	EBAY INC	EBAY	-3.61%	1
2/28/2018	EBAY INC	EBAY	-6.77%	1
7/29/2022	ENPHASE ENERGY INC	ENPH	26.65%	1
10/31/2011	EL PASO CORP	EP	-11.84%	0
10/31/2012	FACEBOOK INC	FB	19.92%	1
7/31/2013	FACEBOOK INC	FB	-0.60%	1
1/31/2014	FACEBOOK INC	FB	-0.80%	1
1/29/2016	FACEBOOK INC	FB	-31.11%	1
4/29/2022	META PLATFORMS INC	FB	15.05%	1
2/28/2014	FOREST LABS INC	FRX	10.13%	0
7/30/2010	GENZYME CORP	GENZ	16.34%	1
4/30/2012	GILEAD SCIENCES INC	GILD	3.90%	1
11/30/2012	GILEAD SCIENCES INC	GILD	-9.22%	1
7/29/2011	GOOGLE INC	GOOG	11.57%	0
10/31/2013	GOOGLE INC	GOOG	27.09%	0
7/31/2015	GOOGLE INC	GOOG	6.85%	1
7/31/2015	GOOGLE INC	GOOGL	N/A	1
7/30/2021	H C A HEALTHCARE INC	HCA	6.14%	0
2/28/2013	HEINZ H J CO	HNZ	N/A	1
2/28/2013	HEWLETT PACKARD CO	HPQ	13.27%	0
5/31/2013	HEWLETT PACKARD CO	HPQ	9.20%	0
5/29/2015	HUMANA INC	HUM	N/A	1
8/31/2017	ILLUMINA INC	ILMN	56.96%	1
7/31/2018	ILLUMINA INC	ILMN	50.92%	1
1/31/2022	ILLUMINA INC	ILMN	N/A	1
8/31/2010	INTUIT INC	INTU	N/A	1
1/29/2016	KINDER MORGAN INC	KMI	65.89%	1
3/31/2015	KRAFT FOODS GROUP INC	KRFT	51.46%	1
10/29/2021	LUCID GROUP INC	LCID	N/A	1
10/31/2019	LAM RESH CORP	LRCX	N/A	1
5/31/2019	MERCADOLIBRE INC	MELI	10.01%	1
7/29/2011	MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC	MHS	-0.54%	1
11/30/2020	MODERNA INC	MRNA	53.15%	1
8/31/2021	MODERNA INC	MRNA	27.33%	1
11/30/2021	MODERNA INC	MRNA	0.70%	1
12/31/2021	MARVELL TECHNOLOGY INC	MRVL	26.29%	1
10/31/2011	MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO	MS	-3.15%	1
6/28/2019	MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC	MU	0.77%	1

Appendix A1 - continued

DATE	Company Name	Ticker Symbol	ASV	$\mathbb{1}_{msg}$
1/31/2014	NETFLIX INC	NFLX	45.32%	1
1/30/2015	NETFLIX INC	NFLX	32.07%	1
4/30/2015	NETFLIX INC	NFLX	49.76%	1
7/31/2015	NETFLIX INC	NFLX	96.75%	1
10/31/2016	NETFLIX INC	NFLX	29.51%	1
7/31/2017	NETFLIX INC	NFLX	39.95%	1
9/30/2014	NIKE INC	NKE	17.55%	1
6/30/2021	NIKE INC	NKE	20.46%	1
11/30/2016	NVIDIA CORP	NVDA	40.46%	1
5/31/2017	NVIDIA CORP	NVDA	37.21%	1
8/31/2011	NEWS CORP	NWSA	N/A	1
12/31/2021	ORACLE CORP	ORCL	13.12%	1
8/31/2021	PALO ALTO NETWORKS INC	PANW	N/A	1
8/31/2010	PRICELINE COM INC	PCLN	N/A	1
8/31/2015	PRECISION CASTPARTS CORP	PCP	2.32%	1
10/30/2020	PINTEREST INC	PINS	4.83%	1
11/30/2020	PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES INC	PLTR	N/A	1
1/29/2021	PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES INC	PLTR	N/A	1
4/30/2019	QUALCOMM INC	QCOM	11.11%	1
10/31/2016	REYNOLDS AMERICAN INC	RAI	2.52%	1
5/28/2021	ROBLOX CORP	RBLX	N/A	1
11/30/2021	ROBLOX CORP	RBLX	N/A	1
9/30/2022	REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS INC	REGN	-0.30%	0
10/31/2018	RED HAT INC	RHT	28.88%	1
1/31/2022	RIVIAN AUTOMOTIVE INC	RIVN	N/A	1
7/30/2021	ROKU INC	ROKU	-3.77%	1
4/30/2014	SPRINT CORP NEW	S	N/A	0
7/29/2016	SPRINT CORP NEW	S	N/A	0
5/31/2019	SPRINT CORP NEW	S	2.00%	0
2/28/2020	SPRINT CORP NEW	S	1.32%	0
6/28/2013	SPECTRA ENERGY CORP	SE	N/A	0
9/30/2016	SPECTRA ENERGY CORP	SE	-1.25%	0
4/30/2020	SNAP INC	SNAP	16.74%	1
10/30/2020	SNAP INC	SNAP	1.08%	1
7/30/2021	SNAP INC	SNAP	-0.69%	1
2/28/2022	SNAP INC	SNAP	6.38%	1
12/31/2021	SNOWFLAKE INC	SNOW	47.91%	1
8/31/2022	SNOWFLAKE INC	SNOW	2.31%	1

Appendix A1 - continued

DATE	Company Name	Ticker Symbol	ASV	$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$
2/28/2022	BLOCK INC	SQ	12.77%	1
6/29/2018	SEMPRA ENERGY	SRE	4.40%	0
8/30/2019	TARGET CORP	TGT	24.99%	1
8/30/2013	TESLA MOTORS INC	TSLA	78.55%	1
2/28/2014	TESLA MOTORS INC	TSLA	63.66%	1
8/31/2018	TESLA INC	TSLA	91.88%	1
10/31/2018	TESLA INC	TSLA	54.76%	1
10/31/2019	TESLA INC	TSLA	14.61%	1
2/28/2020	TESLA INC	TSLA	69.19%	1
3/31/2021	TESLA INC	TSLA	23.45%	1
10/29/2021	TESLA INC	TSLA	28.30%	1
1/31/2022	TESLA INC	TSLA	20.74%	1
11/30/2020	TRADE DESK INC	TTD	13.35%	1
11/30/2021	TRADE DESK INC	TTD	11.35%	1
8/31/2022	TRADE DESK INC	TTD	21.74%	1
7/31/2014	TWITTER INC	TWTR	N/A	1
2/27/2015	TWITTER INC	TWTR	38.42%	1
7/31/2014	TIME WARNER INC NEW	TWX	22.49%	0
3/31/2020	UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC	UBER	-1.62%	1
6/30/2011	VISA INC	V	-8.39%	1
1/31/2013	VALERO ENERGY CORP NEW	VLO	32.00%	0
5/31/2022	VMWARE INC	VMW	N/A	0
3/31/2017	VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC	VRTX	45.55%	1
7/31/2017	VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC	VRTX	31.32%	1
6/29/2018	VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC	VRTX	19.32%	0
9/30/2015	WESTERN DIGITAL CORP	WDC	2.53%	1
6/30/2014	WILLIAMS COS	WMB	21.93%	1
6/30/2015	WILLIAMS COS	WMB	2.52%	1
9/30/2020	ZOOM VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS INC	ZM	27.14%	1

Table A2
Monthly analysis of MAXRET (MAX) and future stock returns

In Panel A, we report average monthly returns for portfolios sorted on MAXRET. MAX events are defined in Table 1 and MAXRET is the MAX-day return. If a stock experiences multiple MAX events for a given month, we set MAXRET to the highest MAXRET for the month. Columns 1–10 correspond to MAXRET-sorted deciles (1=Low, 10=High), and the “High–Low” column reports the Decile-10 minus Decile-1 difference. Row variables list the value-weighted averages (in percentage points) of current-month MAXRET and the one-month-ahead returns: excess returns (RET–RF), Fama-French-Carhart-Pastor-Stambaugh (FFCPS) alphas, and Fama-French five-factor (FF5) alphas. The excess market returns and the size, book-to-market, momentum, profitability, and investment factors are from Kenneth French’s data library. The liquidity factor is from Lubos Pastor’s data library. Panel B presents results of the Fama-MacBeth regression, where one-, two- and three-month-ahead stock returns are regressed on MAXRET and a set of control variables, including the market beta (BETA), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), the natural logarithm of book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). Panel C repeats the Fama-MacBeth regression for one-, two-, and three-month-ahead stock returns, using the highest daily return in a month (MAX) to capture a stock’s lottery-like characteristics, following [Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw \(2011\)](#). The Newey-West adjusted t -statistics are given in parentheses. The sample period for the univariate portfolio analysis spans July 1963 through December 2022. The Fama-MacBeth regression analysis covers the period from February 1972 to December 2022, depending on the availability of the quarterly earnings announcement date (quarterly Compustat item “RDQ”). As a result, the operating profitability measure (OP) begins in 1972. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

A. Univariate Portfolio Analysis											
	1 (Low)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (High)	High–Low
MAXRET	1.63	2.75	3.63	4.50	5.44	6.55	7.95	9.88	13.11	24.03	22.40
RET–RF	0.52*** (3.69)	0.57*** (3.65)	0.50*** (2.89)	0.60*** (3.19)	0.70*** (3.16)	0.62*** (2.64)	0.56** (2.02)	0.30 (0.97)	0.09 (0.28)	-0.46 (-1.36)	-0.99*** (-3.38)
FFCPS	0.06 (0.72)	0.09 (1.50)	-0.04 (-0.68)	0.01 (0.18)	0.03 (0.32)	0.04 (0.43)	-0.07 (-0.67)	-0.36*** (-3.17)	-0.60*** (-3.93)	-1.14*** (-5.37)	-1.20*** (-5.02)
FF5	-0.04 (-0.48)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.11** (-1.96)	0.02 (0.25)	0.10 (1.27)	0.13* (1.71)	0.03 (0.32)	-0.17* (-1.74)	-0.33*** (-2.84)	-0.86*** (-5.21)	-0.82*** (-4.52)

B. Fama-MacBeth Regressions Using MAXRET

	Cumulative Excess Returns		
	One-month (1)	Two-month (2)	Three-month (3)
MAXRET	-0.027*** (-4.15)	-0.064*** (-5.31)	-0.091*** (-4.90)
BETA	0.118 (1.23)	0.197 (1.05)	0.295 (1.06)
SIZE	-0.071** (-2.07)	-0.147** (-2.28)	-0.231** (-2.42)
BM	0.206*** (3.10)	0.445*** (3.57)	0.704*** (3.76)
IA	-0.439*** (-7.80)	-0.800*** (-7.33)	-1.156*** (-7.67)
OP	1.361*** (4.67)	2.572*** (5.39)	3.344*** (5.48)
MOM	0.006*** (4.57)	0.011*** (4.50)	0.016*** (4.44)
REV	-0.047*** (-8.81)	-0.041*** (-5.69)	-0.028*** (-3.22)
ILLIQ	0.008*** (3.92)	0.014*** (3.65)	0.019*** (3.63)
COSKEW	-0.131 (-1.24)	-0.267 (-1.38)	-0.406 (-1.46)
Obs.	1,387,880	1,378,039	1,367,606
Adj. R ² (%)	5.58	6.14	6.38

C. Fama-MacBeth Regressions Using MAX

	Cumulative Excess Returns		
	One-month	Two-month	Three-month
	(1)	(2)	(3)
MAX	-0.031*** (-4.61)	-0.071*** (-5.52)	-0.102*** (-5.15)
BETA	0.106 (1.12)	0.214 (1.15)	0.311 (1.14)
SIZE	-0.070** (-2.11)	-0.150** (-2.33)	-0.231** (-2.42)
BM	0.208*** (3.19)	0.439*** (3.47)	0.685*** (3.67)
IA	-0.434*** (-7.78)	-0.798*** (-7.52)	-1.162*** (-7.84)
OP	1.181*** (4.23)	2.154*** (4.59)	2.792*** (4.66)
MOM	0.006*** (4.51)	0.011*** (4.62)	0.016*** (4.42)
REV	-0.047*** (-8.95)	-0.040*** (-5.53)	-0.025*** (-2.79)
ILLIQ	0.008*** (4.32)	0.016*** (4.00)	0.020*** (4.08)
COSKEW	-0.149 (-1.41)	-0.245 (-1.27)	-0.353 (-1.29)
Obs.	1,971,676	1,957,317	1,942,969
Adj. R ² (%)	5.40	5.97	6.21

Table A3
Monthly analysis of maxret-sorted portfolios in samples excluding small firms

This table reports the average monthly returns for portfolios sorted by MAXRET, separately for stocks excluding micro-caps (Panel A) and for NYSE-above-median size stocks (Panel B). MAX events are defined in Table 1, and MAXRET refers to the return on the MAX day. Columns 1–10 correspond to MAXRET-sorted deciles (1=Low, 10=High), and the “High–Low” column reports the Decile-10 minus Decile-1 difference. Row variables list the one-month-ahead value-weighted average monthly returns (in percentage points): excess returns (RET–RF), Fama-French-Carhart-Pastor-Stambaugh (FFCPS) alphas, and Fama-French five-factor (FF5) alphas. Excess market returns and the size, book-to-market, momentum, profitability, and investment factors are from Kenneth French’s data library; the liquidity factor is from Lubos Pastor’s data library. Newey-West adjusted *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample period spans July 1963 through December 2022. **p* < .1; ***p* < .05; ****p* < .01.

Panel A. Portfolios after removing micro stocks											
	1 (Low)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (High)	High–Low
RET–RF	0.57 (4.02)	0.57 (3.62)	0.49 (2.87)	0.59 (3.15)	0.70 (3.17)	0.61 (2.64)	0.56 (2.02)	0.30 (0.97)	0.13 (0.39)	-0.25 (-0.73)	-0.82** (-2.66)
FFCPS	0.10 (1.11)	0.08 (1.42)	-0.05 (-0.75)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.28)	0.03 (0.39)	-0.07 (-0.63)	-0.36 (-2.84)	-0.56 (-3.13)	-0.90 (-3.52)	-1.00*** (-3.51)
FF5	0.01 (0.12)	0.00 (-0.06)	-0.11 (-2.03)	0.01 (0.15)	0.11 (1.27)	0.14 (1.74)	0.04 (0.41)	-0.15 (-1.37)	-0.26 (-1.76)	-0.60 (-2.83)	-0.61** (-2.64)

Panel B. Portfolios comprising large-cap stocks											
	1 (Low)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (High)	High–Low
RET–RF	0.64 (4.12)	0.55 (3.34)	0.42 (2.42)	0.49 (2.52)	0.63 (2.70)	0.54 (2.22)	0.52 (1.82)	0.28 (0.84)	0.24 (0.65)	-0.23 (-0.60)	-0.88** (-2.41)
FFCPS	0.20 (1.82)	0.07 (1.12)	-0.10 (-1.42)	-0.07 (-0.89)	-0.03 (-0.33)	0.00 (-0.02)	-0.07 (-0.47)	-0.33 (-2.07)	-0.42 (-1.63)	-0.82 (-2.44)	-1.02*** (-2.78)
FF5	0.13 (1.31)	-0.01 (-0.16)	-0.15 (-2.68)	-0.05 (-0.66)	0.08 (0.82)	0.13 (1.43)	0.08 (0.62)	-0.08 (-0.52)	-0.05 (-0.23)	-0.51 (-1.67)	-0.63* (-1.95)

Table A4
Pre- and post-publication comparison of the lottery-demand effect

This table presents the one-month-ahead monthly return differences (in percentage points) between the top (Decile 10) and bottom (Decile 1) value-weighted portfolios, sorted by BCW MAX (the highest daily return in a month) or MAXRET (the return on the MAX day, as defined in Table 1). Results are reported for the pre-publication period (July 1963–February 2011) and the post-publication period (March 2011–December 2022). Row variables include the average excess return spreads ($RET - RF$), Fama-French-Carhart-Pastor-Stambaugh (FFCPS) alphas, and Fama-French five-factor (FF5) alphas. Factor data are sourced from Kenneth French's and Lubos Pastor's libraries. Newey-West adjusted t -statistics are in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

	BCW MAX		MAXRET	
	Pre-publication	Post-publication	Pre-publication	Post-publication
RET–RF	-0.86** (-2.41)	-1.18** (-2.52)	-0.91*** (-2.67)	-1.32** (-2.49)
FFCPS	-1.12*** (-4.27)	-1.28*** (-3.07)	-1.15*** (-4.13)	-1.31*** (-2.63)
FF5	-0.62*** (-3.10)	-1.13*** (-3.32)	-0.74*** (-3.60)	-1.16*** (-2.74)

Table A5
Panel regression analysis of MAXRET and future returns: Baseline model

This table reports the results of panel regressions of post-MAX returns on lagged explanatory variables. MAX events are defined in Table 1 and MAXRET is the MAX-day return. Cumulative returns are reported in percentages and are measured over windows [1, 21], [1, 42], and [1, 63], respectively. The control variables include the market beta (BETA), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), the natural logarithm of book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). For presentation purposes, the reported coefficients for illiquidity are multiplied by 100. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and *t*-statistics are shown in parentheses. **p* < .1; ***p* < .05; ****p* < .01.

	Cumulative Return		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
MAXRET	-0.104** (-2.32)	-0.141** (-2.56)	-0.187*** (-2.68)
BETA	0.001 (0.48)	0.002 (0.51)	0.001 (0.30)
SIZE	-0.027*** (-11.18)	-0.055*** (-11.72)	-0.081*** (-10.74)
BM	0.001 (0.40)	0.001 (0.48)	0.004 (1.29)
IA	-0.002 (-1.07)	-0.007** (-2.10)	-0.008* (-1.80)
OP	0.037*** (6.36)	0.058*** (5.68)	0.059*** (3.70)
MOM	-0.006*** (-2.72)	-0.018*** (-5.03)	-0.026*** (-5.29)
REV	-0.021*** (-2.87)	-0.031** (-2.49)	-0.058*** (-3.49)
ILLIQ	-0.006 (-0.38)	-0.005 (-0.21)	0.006 (0.21)
COSKEW	-0.009 (-1.52)	-0.017* (-1.81)	-0.019* (-1.83)
Obs.	430,091	426,151	421,596
Adj. <i>R</i> ² (%)	10.18	15.52	17.15

Table A6
Social interactions and lottery stock returns: Alternative StockTwits sample

This table repeats Table 2 using the alternative StockTwits data shared by [Cookson and Niessner \(2020\)](#) for the period from 2010 to 2021. See Table 2 for regression specification and variable descriptions.

	Cumulative Return		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
MAXRET $\cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.122** (-2.04)	-0.181*** (-3.35)	-0.257*** (-3.63)
MAXRET	-0.065 (-1.16)	-0.077 (-1.17)	-0.104 (-1.26)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.005 (1.09)	0.009** (2.02)	0.015 (1.44)
BETA	0.001 (0.60)	0.003 (0.76)	0.002 (0.51)
SIZE	-0.028*** (-10.62)	-0.058*** (-12.02)	-0.086*** (-11.25)
BM	0.001 (0.70)	0.002 (0.75)	0.005 (1.47)
IA	0.000 (0.03)	-0.004 (-1.46)	-0.005 (-1.28)
OP	0.035*** (5.82)	0.053*** (5.20)	0.058*** (3.69)
MOM	-0.009*** (-3.73)	-0.023*** (-6.54)	-0.033*** (-6.94)
REV	-0.016** (-2.18)	-0.025* (-1.95)	-0.050*** (-2.97)
ILLIQ	-0.022 (-1.38)	-0.022 (-0.95)	-0.014 (-0.48)
COSKEW	-0.010 (-1.63)	-0.018* (-1.88)	-0.017 (-1.62)
Obs.	384,745	383,852	382,791
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.25	15.79	17.70

Table A7
Social interactions and lottery stock returns around future earnings announcements

This table presents results of a panel regression examining the relationship between StockTwits message activity surrounding MAX event days and subsequent earnings announcement returns. MAX events are defined in Table 1 and MAXRET is the MAX-day return. The dependent variable is the DGTW-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns, for the three days surrounding the subsequent quarter's earnings announcement. $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$ equals one if the stock ranks in the top 10% for messages posted during the $[-11, 0]$ window. The control variables include the market beta (BETA), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), the natural logarithm of book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). For presentation purposes, the reported coefficients for illiquidity are multiplied by 100. The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and the resultant t -statistics are shown in parentheses. $*p < .1$; $**p < .05$; $***p < .01$.

	CAR $[-1, 1]$	
	(1)	(2)
MAXRET $\cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$		-0.025** (-2.47)
MAXRET	-0.030*** (-5.08)	-0.021*** (-3.07)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$		0.002 (1.18)
BETA	0.001 (0.81)	0.001 (0.82)
SIZE	-0.011*** (-14.80)	-0.011*** (-14.83)
BM	0.000 (-0.49)	0.000 (-0.53)
IA	0.000 (0.95)	0.000 (0.94)
OP	0.000 (-0.36)	0.000 (-0.35)
MOM	-0.003*** (-4.42)	-0.003*** (-4.36)
REV	-0.005** (-2.04)	-0.005* (-1.96)
ILLIQ	0.011 (1.02)	0.010 (0.94)
COSKEW	-0.001 (-0.73)	-0.001 (-0.78)
Obs.	128,088	127,992
Adj. R ² (%)	6.4	6.4

Table A8

State Social Media Privacy Laws

This table presents the implementation dates and statutory citations of state-level social media privacy laws that protect employees' use of social media from employer monitoring. These laws typically prohibit employers from requesting passwords, demanding access to personal accounts, or taking adverse actions based on employees' refusal to provide such access. Data are compiled from the Seyfarth Social Media Survey and additional research.

State	Effective Date	Citation
Arkansas	2013-04-22	Password Protection Act (Act 1480, HB 1901)
California	2013-01-01	Labor Code 980 (AB 1844)
Colorado	2013-05-11	C.R.S. §8-2-127 (Social Media and the Workplace Act)
Connecticut	2015-10-01	Conn. Gen. Stat. §31-40x (PA15-6)
Delaware	2015-08-07	19 Del. C. §709A (HB109)
Hawaii	2021-06-07	Act 39 (HB 125) – UESOPPA
Illinois	2013-01-01	820 ILCS 55/10 (Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act)
Louisiana	2014-08-01	La. Rev. Stat. §51:1951-55 (Personal Online Account Privacy Protection Act)
Maine	2015-10-15	26 M.R.S. §616-619
Maryland	2012-10-01	Lab. & Emp. §3-712 (User Name & Password Privacy Protection Act)
Michigan	2012-12-27	MCL §37.271-278 (Internet Privacy Protection Act)
Montana	2015-04-23	Mont. Code §39-2-307
Nebraska	2016-07-21	Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-3501 et seq. (Workplace Privacy Act)
Nevada	2013-10-01	NRS §613.135
New Hampshire	2014-09-30	N.H. Rev. Stat. §275:74 et seq.
New Jersey	2013-12-01	N.J. Stat. §34:6B-5 to -10
New York	2024-03-12	N.Y. Lab. Law §201-i
Oklahoma	2014-11-01	40 Okla. St. §173.2
Oregon	2014-01-01	ORS §659A.330
Rhode Island	2014-06-30	R.I. Gen. Laws §28-56-1 et seq. (Social Media Privacy Act)
Tennessee	2015-01-01	Tenn. Code §50-1-1001 et seq. (Employee Online Privacy Act)
Utah	2013-05-14	Utah Code §34-48-201 et seq. (Internet Employment Privacy Act)
Vermont	2018-01-01	21 V.S.A. §4951
Virginia	2015-07-01	Va. Code §40.1-28.7:5
Washington	2013-07-28	RCW §49.44.200-.205
West Virginia	2016-06-10	W. Va. Code §21-5H-1 et seq.
Wisconsin	2014-04-10	Wis. Stat. §995.55

Table A9

Social interactions and lottery stock returns: Alternative lottery measure

This table examines the relationship between StockTwits message activity and post-lottery event returns using a lottery index adapted from Kumar (2009). The dependent variables are cumulative returns over 21, 42, and 63 trading days. $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$ equals one if the StockTwits message counts during the $[-11, 0]$ window rank in the top decile of the full cross-section of stocks. Control variables include lagged monthly return (REV), market beta (BETA), log firm size (SIZE), log book-to-market ratio (BM), asset growth (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and t -statistics are shown in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

	Cumulative Returns		
	[1,21] (1)	[1,42] (2)	[1,63] (3)
LTRY · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.127** (-2.21)	-0.271*** (-3.09)	-0.365*** (-2.97)
LTRY	-0.009 (-0.41)	-0.050 (-1.42)	-0.069 (-1.54)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.206 (0.76)	0.501 (1.17)	0.579 (1.04)
BETA	0.091 (0.47)	0.180 (0.60)	0.290 (0.79)
SIZE	-2.762*** (-12.35)	-5.479*** (-13.20)	-7.998*** (-13.00)
BM	0.010 (0.08)	0.102 (0.52)	0.198 (0.73)
IA	-0.285* (-1.76)	-0.594** (-2.42)	-1.044*** (-2.97)
OP	2.693*** (6.14)	3.532*** (4.49)	3.633*** (3.27)
MOM	-0.828*** (-3.32)	-1.645*** (-4.67)	-2.517*** (-5.59)
REV	-1.236** (-2.03)	-2.424*** (-2.73)	-3.405*** (-3.58)
ILLIQ	0.829* (1.73)	1.843* (1.80)	1.774 (1.52)
COSKEW	-0.415 (-0.68)	-1.151 (-1.28)	-1.617 (-1.64)
Obs.	434,716	433,700	432,570
Adj. R^2 (%)	13.71	15.24	16.87

Table A10

StockTwits message volume and lottery event prediction: Alternative lottery measure

This table examines whether StockTwits message volume predicts the likelihood of a stock achieving lottery status using a lottery index adapted from Kumar (2009). A lottery event occurs when a stock's SumRank ranking is in the top decile. Columns 1 and 2 use the full sample of stock-month observations and correspond to the dependent variable, $\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$, which equals one if a stock experiences a lottery event, and zero otherwise. $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preMonth}$ equals one if the StockTwits message counts mentioning the stock during the previous month rank in the top decile of the full cross-section of stocks. $R^{preEvent}$ is the cumulative return during the $[-11, -1]$ window relative to the month end. The control variables include the market beta (BETA), the natural log of market capitalization (SIZE), the natural logarithm of book-to-market (BM), total asset growth rate (IA), operating profitability (OP), momentum (MOM), past one-month return (REV), illiquidity (ILLIQ), and co-skewness (COSKEW). The sample period is from 2010 to 2022. Firm and year-month fixed effects are included. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year-month, and t -statistics are shown in parentheses. $*p < .1$; $**p < .05$; $***p < .01$.

	$\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$	
	(1)	(2)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preMonth}$	0.022*** (7.13)	0.029*** (10.94)
$R^{preEvent}$	-0.056*** (-6.11)	-0.009 (-1.23)
BETA		0.007*** (3.43)
SIZE		-0.067*** (-30.83)
BM		0.002 (1.02)
IA		-0.011*** (-5.25)
OP		-0.022*** (-4.40)
MOM		-0.046*** (-17.69)
REV		-0.029*** (-4.03)
ILLIQ		0.049*** (6.44)
COSKEW		0.001 (0.21)
Obs.	501,340	435,690
Adj. R^2 (%)	25.36	27.86

Table A11
Social interactions and lottery stock returns: Alternative message windows

This table reproduces Table 2 using alternative definitions of StockTwits message indicator, $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$, that are measured with different event windows: $[-5, 0]$, $[-3, 0]$, and $[-1, 0]$, respectively. See Table 2 for regression specification and variable definitions.

<i>A. Message Window: [-5, 0]</i>			
	Cumulative Return		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
MAXRET · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.103* (-1.93)	-0.155*** (-3.45)	-0.192*** (-2.90)
MAXRET	-0.056 (-1.05)	-0.069 (-1.12)	-0.105 (-1.35)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.003 (0.72)	0.004 (0.98)	0.008 (0.96)
Obs.	429,002	425,079	420,526
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.20	15.55	17.17
<i>B. Message Window: [-3, 0]</i>			
MAXRET · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.101* (-1.90)	-0.141*** (-2.86)	-0.155** (-2.27)
MAXRET	-0.048 (-0.82)	-0.063 (-0.94)	-0.107 (-1.24)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.002 (0.49)	0.002 (0.59)	0.005 (0.64)
Obs.	429,002	425,079	420,526
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.20	15.55	17.17
<i>C. Message Window: [-1, 0]</i>			
MAXRET · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.083 (-1.47)	-0.136*** (-2.63)	-0.136* (-1.90)
MAXRET	-0.055 (-0.81)	-0.056 (-0.75)	-0.103 (-1.04)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.004 (1.26)	0.004 (1.37)	0.004 (0.74)
Obs.	429,002	425,079	420,526
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.19	15.54	17.16

Table A12
Social interactions and lottery stock returns: robustness to additional controls

This table extends Table 2 by controlling for analyst coverage (CVRG) in Panel A, firm-level news (NEWS) in Panel B, and arbitrage costs measured by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) in Panel C, and arbitrage cost index (COST) in Panel D, respectively. See Table 2 for regression specification and variable definitions.

<i>A. Investor Attention: CVRG</i>			
	Cumulative Return		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
MAXRET · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.144*** (-3.48)	-0.167*** (-3.42)	-0.245*** (-3.61)
CVRG	0.000 (-0.02)	0.000 (-0.07)	-0.002 (-0.40)
Obs.	428,979	425,056	420,503
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.22	15.58	17.19
<i>B. Information Supply: NEWS</i>			
MAXRET · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.156*** (-3.27)	-0.190*** (-3.68)	-0.285*** (-3.70)
NEWS	-0.001 (-1.33)	-0.003*** (-2.75)	-0.005*** (-3.13)
Obs.	357,905	357,047	356,058
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.39	15.32	17.59
<i>C. Arbitrage Cost: IVOL</i>			
MAXRET · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.143*** (-3.46)	-0.166*** (-3.39)	-0.244*** (-3.61)
IVOL	0.000 (-0.94)	-0.001 (-1.13)	-0.001 (-0.65)
Obs.	428,979	425,056	420,503
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.22	15.59	17.19
<i>D. Arbitrage Cost: COST</i>			
MAXRET · $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.139*** (-3.36)	-0.158*** (-3.23)	-0.232*** (-3.42)
COST	0.004*** (2.71)	0.008*** (3.13)	0.011*** (3.63)
Obs.	428,979	425,056	420,503
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.23	15.61	17.22

Table A13
Social interactions and lottery stock returns: Alternative lottery event definitions

This table examines the robustness of the results presented in Table 2 to alternative lottery event definitions. Panel A corresponds to a path-independent lottery event definition. For each stock i and each day t , we compute its maximum daily return over $[t-20, t]$. We then define a lottery event for stock i on day t if the stock's return on day t exceeds the 90th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of these rolling maxima. Panel B corresponds to a lottery event definition with non-overlapping windows between the pre-event message window and the window used to define MAX events. Specifically, a MAX event occurs when a stock's return on a given day (day 0) is equal to or greater than its highest single-day return over the $[-32, -12]$ trading-day window. A stock experience a lottery event if it has a MAX event and the MAX-day return (MAXRET) falls within the top 10% compared to the highest single-day return of all stocks in their respective $[-32, -12]$ windows. Since this alternatively-defined lottery events do not have an associated MAX event, it is not directly applicable to Table 2. We therefore estimate a modified version of this table by replacing MAXRET with an indicator for lottery events. See Table 2 for regression specification and additional variable definitions.

<i>A. Path-Independent Lottery Event Definition</i>			
	Cumulative Returns		
	[1, 21] (1)	[1, 42] (2)	[1, 63] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{lottery} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.032*** (-6.40)	-0.043*** (-6.91)	-0.062*** (-5.85)
$\mathbb{1}_{lottery}$	-0.015*** (-5.25)	-0.020*** (-5.35)	-0.021*** (-4.56)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.004* (-1.82)	-0.008** (-2.27)	-0.011** (-2.06)
BETA	0.002 (1.09)	0.003 (1.16)	0.004 (1.05)
SIZE	-0.026*** (-12.81)	-0.052*** (-12.33)	-0.079*** (-12.14)
BM	0.001 (0.48)	0.001 (0.76)	0.003 (0.97)
IA	-0.003** (-2.44)	-0.007*** (-2.73)	-0.010*** (-2.79)
OP	0.034*** (7.98)	0.051*** (5.93)	0.059*** (4.78)
MOM	-0.009*** (-3.71)	-0.018*** (-5.34)	-0.028*** (-6.19)
REV	-0.016** (-2.51)	-0.033*** (-3.31)	-0.046*** (-4.14)
ILLIQ	0.014 (1.27)	0.031 (1.50)	0.038 (1.33)
COSKEW	-0.005 (-0.96)	-0.011 (-1.24)	-0.017* (-1.74)
Obs.	9,011,326	8,926,038	8,839,161
Adj. R^2 (%)	10.65	14.58	17.15

B. Non-Overlapping Lottery Event Definition

	Cumulative Returns		
	[1, 21]	[1, 42]	[1, 63]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
MAXRET $\cdot \mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	-0.103*** (-3.26)	-0.109*** (-2.75)	-0.177*** (-3.37)
MAXRET	-0.078*** (-2.71)	-0.109*** (-2.90)	-0.097** (-1.98)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}$	0.002 (0.47)	0.000 (-0.01)	0.003 (0.37)
BETA	0.001 (0.45)	0.003 (0.80)	0.002 (0.52)
SIZE	-0.028*** (-10.28)	-0.055*** (-11.01)	-0.083*** (-10.52)
BM	-0.001 (-0.52)	0.000 (0.19)	0.004 (1.23)
IA	-0.002 (-1.05)	-0.006* (-1.76)	-0.006 (-1.32)
OP	0.032*** (4.54)	0.046*** (3.98)	0.053*** (3.49)
MOM	-0.005* (-1.90)	-0.016*** (-4.34)	-0.025*** (-4.31)
REV	-0.020** (-2.30)	-0.038*** (-2.64)	-0.063*** (-3.48)
ILLIQ	-0.007 (-0.43)	-0.013 (-0.59)	-0.001 (-0.02)
COSKEW	-0.014* (-1.71)	-0.023* (-1.95)	-0.024* (-1.96)
Obs.	436,243	432,103	426,104
Adj. R^2 (%)	11.64	16.93	18.16

Table A14

Predicting lottery events: Alternative lottery event definitions

This table evaluates the robustness of the results presented in Table 3 to alternative lottery event definitions (refer to Table A13 for detailed definitions). Panel A presents findings based on the path-independent lottery event definition, while Panel B uses the non-overlapping lottery event definition. The regression specification and additional variable definitions are provided in Table 3.

<i>A. Path-Independent Lottery Event Definition</i>				
	Sample: All days $\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$		Sample: lottery event days Lottery-event day return	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\mathbb{1}^{preEvent}_{mssg}$	0.804*** (16.77)	0.860*** (18.86)	0.569* (1.72)	0.963*** (2.92)
$R^{preEvent}$	-0.305 (-0.98)	-0.409 (-1.36)	2.243*** (3.13)	1.687** (2.38)
BETA		0.056** (2.48)		-0.050 (-0.20)
SIZE		-0.518*** (-23.32)		-2.110*** (-13.37)
BM		-0.034** (-2.14)		-0.435*** (-2.74)
IA		-0.041** (-2.00)		-0.330** (-1.99)
OP		-0.361*** (-5.87)		-0.579 (-1.26)
MOM		-0.242*** (-8.01)		-1.332*** (-9.49)
REV		-0.042 (-0.51)		-0.661** (-2.09)
ILLIQ		0.030*** (9.34)		0.027 (1.41)
COSKEW		0.020 (0.43)		-1.524** (-2.02)
Obs.	9,087,250	9,087,250	61,764	61,764
Adj. R^2 (%)	1.46	1.62	5.35	6.10

B. Non-Overlapping Lottery Event Definition

	Sample: All days		Sample: lottery event days	
	$\mathbb{1}^{lottery}$		Lottery-event day return	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\mathbb{1}^{preEvent}_{mssg}$	0.413*** (13.14)	0.475*** (15.30)	1.138** (2.26)	1.515*** (2.99)
$R^{preEvent}$	0.049 (0.23)	0.158 (0.77)	0.457 (0.42)	-1.695 (-1.49)
BETA		0.034** (2.44)		0.102 (0.28)
SIZE		-0.318*** (-21.31)		-3.081*** (-13.68)
BM		-0.014 (-1.35)		-0.763*** (-3.17)
IA		-0.024* (-1.84)		-0.622** (-2.37)
OP		-0.176*** (-4.68)		-0.895 (-1.18)
MOM		-0.155*** (-9.39)		-1.804*** (-8.33)
REV		-0.775*** (-10.42)		3.054*** (3.17)
ILLIQ		0.017*** (9.65)		0.045 (1.58)
COSKEW		0.004 (0.13)		-2.231* (-1.97)
Obs.	9,089,756	9,089,756	39,676	39,676
Adj. R^2 (%)	0.82	0.95	5.78	6.87

Table A15
Social interactions and retail herding in lottery stocks: Alternative lottery event definitions

This table examines the robustness of the results presented in Table 4 to alternative lottery event definitions (details in Table A13). Panel A corresponds to the path-independent lottery event definition. Panel B corresponds to the non-overlapping lottery event definition. Regression specifications and the definitions of other variables follow Table 4.

<i>A. Path-Independent Lottery Event Definition</i>			
	HR[0] (1)	HR[1, 5] (2)	HR[6, 10] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	0.027 (1.31)	0.021*** (3.02)	0.010* (1.74)
Return	0.036** (2.38)	0.029*** (4.11)	0.004 (0.78)
HR	1.017*** (15.10)	0.085*** (5.65)	0.030*** (4.46)
USER	0.034*** (8.37)	0.014*** (11.39)	0.007*** (6.14)
Δ USER	0.325** (2.54)	-0.001 (-0.11)	-0.008 (-1.46)
AbVol	-0.010 (-0.96)	-0.005** (-2.37)	0.000 (0.12)
AbNews	-0.004 (-0.29)	-0.003* (-1.85)	-0.003** (-2.32)
EA	-0.012 (-0.65)	-0.018*** (-3.43)	-0.015*** (-5.14)
Obs.	10,681	10,643	10,642
Adj. R^2 (%)	19.88	17.92	6.99

B. Non-Overlapping Lottery Event Definition

	HR[0]	HR[1, 5]	HR[6, 10]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	0.039**	0.012*	0.005
	(2.29)	(1.81)	(1.00)
Return	0.035**	0.032***	0.005
	(2.16)	(4.84)	(1.12)
HR	1.031***	0.089***	0.029***
	(13.00)	(4.84)	(3.71)
USER	0.033***	0.014***	0.007***
	(7.65)	(12.43)	(5.51)
Δ USER	0.323**	-0.004	-0.008
	(2.23)	(-0.50)	(-1.59)
AbVol	-0.023*	-0.005**	0.000
	(-2.00)	(-2.62)	(0.41)
AbNews	-0.016	-0.004*	-0.002*
	(-0.97)	(-1.99)	(-2.01)
EA	-0.023	-0.017***	-0.014***
	(-1.43)	(-3.69)	(-6.05)
Obs.	8,895	8,862	8,861
Adj. R^2 (%)	22.35	18.60	6.78

Table A16
Social interactions and retail trading of lottery stocks: Alternative lottery event definitions

This table examines the robustness of the results presented in Table 5 to alternative lottery event definitions (details in Table A13). Panels A and B correspond to the non-overlapping lottery event definition. Panels C and D correspond to the path-independent lottery event definition. The Robinhood sample (Panels A and C) covers 06/2018–08/2020, and the StockTwits sample (Panels B and D) covers 01/2010–12/2022. Regression specifications and the definitions of other variables follow Table 5.

<i>A. Path-Independent Lottery Event Definition: Robinhood Sample</i>			
	OIB[0] (1)	OIB[1, 5] (2)	OIB[6, 10] (3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	2.141*** (4.01)	1.743*** (3.38)	0.441 (1.27)
OIB	0.037 (1.32)	0.035*** (3.12)	0.028* (1.76)
Return	-0.619 (-1.38)	2.456*** (5.03)	0.786* (2.01)
HR	0.772** (2.07)	0.824*** (2.85)	1.607*** (3.25)
USER	-0.621*** (-3.03)	1.137*** (7.82)	0.939*** (7.20)
Δ USER	4.064 (1.47)	0.298 (0.70)	0.267 (0.93)
AbVol	-0.429 (-0.62)	-1.062*** (-7.12)	-1.095*** (-6.49)
AbNews	-3.612*** (-3.39)	-0.306 (-1.22)	0.006 (0.03)
EA	1.419 (1.63)	0.183 (0.37)	1.314* (1.91)
Obs.	10,681	10,874	10,872
Adj. R^2 (%)	1.26	2.93	1.95

B. Path-Independent Lottery Event Definition: StockTwits Sample

	OIB[0]	OIB[1,5]	OIB[6,10]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	-0.432 (-1.26)	1.448*** (7.66)	1.220*** (5.83)
Return	-1.020*** (-3.46)	0.898** (2.59)	-0.172 (-0.66)
OIB	0.042*** (3.25)	0.030*** (8.23)	0.027*** (6.83)
AbVol	-0.062 (-0.25)	-0.514*** (-7.09)	-0.422*** (-6.39)
AbNews	-0.536 (-1.46)	-0.612*** (-6.81)	-0.539*** (-6.46)
EA	-0.385 (-1.08)	0.853*** (2.79)	1.913*** (5.81)
Obs.	65,649	68,810	68,721
Adj. R^2 (%)	6.61	7.65	6.22

C. Non-Overlapping Lottery Event Definition: Robinhood Sample

	OIB[0]	OIB[1,5]	OIB[6,10]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	2.230*** (3.43)	1.412** (2.63)	0.583 (1.11)
OIB	0.043 (1.42)	0.046*** (4.10)	0.034* (1.97)
Return	-0.738* (-1.72)	2.278*** (5.62)	0.572 (1.43)
HR	0.639** (2.17)	1.168*** (3.16)	1.672*** (3.19)
USER	-0.683** (-2.46)	1.130*** (9.62)	0.838*** (5.25)
Δ USER	3.620 (1.33)	0.594 (1.20)	0.638** (2.14)
AbVol	0.005 (0.01)	-1.143*** (-6.07)	-1.186*** (-4.84)
AbNews	-4.256*** (-3.63)	-0.404 (-1.46)	-0.055 (-0.31)
EA	1.228 (1.02)	0.456 (0.86)	1.415** (2.24)
Obs.	8,895	9,074	9,073
Adj. R^2 (%)	0.98	2.82	1.84

D. Non-Overlapping Lottery Event Definition: StockTwits Sample

	OIB[0]	OIB[1, 5]	OIB[6, 10]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^{preEvent}$ (or $\mathbb{1}_{mssg}^0$)	-0.445 (-1.22)	1.420*** (5.72)	1.338*** (5.92)
OIB	0.025* (1.88)	0.034*** (7.04)	0.033*** (7.06)
Return	-1.109*** (-3.05)	1.120*** (3.34)	0.038 (0.14)
AbVol	-0.069 (-0.23)	-0.700*** (-7.20)	-0.524*** (-6.62)
AbNews	-0.354 (-0.81)	-0.635*** (-6.39)	-0.625*** (-6.33)
EA	-0.402 (-0.88)	1.036*** (3.42)	1.978*** (6.07)
Obs.	50,297	52,648	52,585
Adj. R^2 (%)	7.02	8.30	6.79